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Market for corporate control 
Ownership structure 
A B S T R A C T   
This study examines the impact of horizontal acquisition announcements on the value of direct 
competitors of the combined entity. We argue that the ownership structure of the target drives 
competitor wealth effects. First, the stronger disciplining force of the market for corporate control 
for public firms compared to private firms will lead to higher competitive pressure post- 
acquisition when a public firm is acquired, leading to more negative valuation effects of direct 
competitors. Second, acquisitions of subsidiary targets, compared to stand-alone targets, are ex-
pected to lead to stronger asset utilization improvements in the target, leading to more negative 
competitor returns. A unique hand-collected sample of 1038 direct competitors of 228 horizontal 
acquisitions in Europe empirically supports these hypotheses. Alternative explanations, such as 
information asymmetry or empire-building, are rejected.   
1. Introduction 
On September 2, 2013, the global technology and internet companies Apple, IBM, and Yahoo experienced a significant drop of 
− 0.83%, − 1.32%, and − 3.76%, respectively in their share prices, despite not making any major announcements around that date. 
These negative stock price reactions were reflecting Microsoft’s announcement that it would acquire the Devices and Services business 
of its competitor Nokia in a deal worth $7 billion. In contrast, the July 2015 announcement that Honeywell was acquiring Teaford, a 
privately held manufacturer of gas and electricity meters, positively affected its closest competitors; the shares of Siemens, Itron, and 
Emerson generated positive abnormal returns of 2.15%, 4.85%, and 1.01%, respectively. This anecdotal evidence suggests that intra- 
industry acquisitions strongly impact a firm’s direct competitors, but the implications vary widely depending on the nature of the deal 
and company characteristics. While consequences of an acquisition for the combining firms are well documented, literature on the 
consequences for competitors is scarce, and the findings are mixed. Some studies report a positive effect for competitors (e.g., Eckbo, 
1983, 1985; Clougherty and Duso, 2011), while others report a negative effect (e.g., Shahrur, 2005; Derien et al., 2020), suggesting 
that confounding effects might exist. This study focuses on the impact of a horizontal acquisition1 on the value of close competitors2 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: virginie.mataigne@ugent.be (V. Mataigne).   
1 A horizontal acquisition occurs when one company acquires another company offering similar goods and services and both companies are at the 
same level of production. This contrasts with a vertical acquisition, when a company acquires another company that is a part of the same industry but at 
a different production level, for example a supplier or a customer. This study only explores horizontal acquisitions because competitive effects following 
horizontal acquisitions are theoretically different from competitive effects following inter-industry acquisitions (Clougherty and Duso, 2009).  
2 By definition, the competitors of the acquirers and the targets are the same in a horizontal acquisition, as both companies compete in the same 
product-market space. 
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and proposes that the ownership structure of the target explains competitor announcement effects. Largely overlooked, target 
ownership structure is an important explanatory factor, as the market for corporate control operates differently depending on that 
structure (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Arikan and Stulz, 2016). 
This study distinguishes between acquisitions of listed and unlisted targets and how these two types of acquisitions affect com-
petitors differently. Following the market for corporate control literature, an M&A facilitates the replacement of ineffective target 
management (Manne, 1965) and increases the target’s performance post-M&A. The market for corporate control has a stronger 
disciplining effect in acquisitions of public compared to private targets due to the separation of ownership and control in public firms. 
This study argues that this should weaken the competitive position of competing firms and, consequently, that competitors’ returns 
will be more negatively affected by the announcement of an acquisition of a public compared to a private target. 
Additionally, this study distinguishes between stand-alone targets and subsidiaries, as the market for corporate control will operate 
differently for the two firm types. Parent companies mainly divest subsidiaries considered non-core to the business or less productive 
(Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002). These subsidiaries are typically bought by acquirers that have a better 
asset fit (Laamanen et al., 2014); therefore, the target’s asset utilization is expected to improve stronger for a subsidiary compared to a 
stand-alone target, negatively impacting the relative competitive positions of competitors. Therefore, the expectation is a more 
negative market reaction for competitors upon the announcement of the acquisition of a subsidiary compared to the announcement of 
the acquisition of a stand-alone target. 
While there is a growing literature analyzing the impact of target ownership on acquirer returns (Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio et al., 
2006), to our knowledge, this is the first study to specifically investigate the effect of target ownership differences on direct com-
petitors.3 Consequently, this research contributes to a better understanding of how governance issues spillover to direct competitors, 
generating diverging stock price reactions. Prior studies on the rivals4 of M&As seek to understand the motivations and announcement 
returns of the acquirers (e.g., McAfee and Williams, 1992; Shahrur, 2005; Song and Walkling, 2000). These studies analyze the impact 
on all industry participants and advance both positive and negative arguments about rivals affected by M&A announcements (Fee and 
Thomas, 2004; Derrien et al., 2020). However, there are few studies that focus on the impact of an acquisition on close competitors 
(Clougherty and Duso, 2009, 2011). Nevertheless, a horizontal merger of two competitors changes the competitive tension and may, in 
particular, have important implications for the competing firms, rather than significantly impacting an entire industry. Gur and 
Greckhamer (2019) have stressed the need for more research regarding correct competitor identification, and this study responds 
appropriately. We do not rely on the industry classifications typically used in M&A studies; rather, we identify the closest competitors 
of the combining firms through the antitrust research of the European Commission. 
To test the proposed hypotheses, the study uses a hand-collected sample of the 1038 closest competitors of 228 large horizontal 
acquisitions in the manufacturing industry between 1997 and 2015. These transactions were analyzed by the European Commission 
(EC) under the antitrust legislation. EC experts have scrutinized each deal and manually identified the directly competing firms, which 
allows research to focus on close competitors’ valuation effects rather than industry effects. The empirical results confirm the hy-
potheses; compared to competitors of public targets, competitors of private targets experience announcement returns that are 1.45 
percentage points higher over the five-day window surrounding the announcement. Additionally, the negative impact of public target 
acquisitions on competitors is greater when agency problems in the target firm are expected to be more severe. Furthermore, com-
petitors of subsidiary targets are more negatively affected, with returns that are 0.90 percentage point lower compared to competitors 
of stand-alone targets. Especially when the subsidiary has a weak fit with its former parent or when the parent firm is restructuring, 
competitors are more negatively affected by the acquisition announcement. Finally, competitors of subsidiaries of a public parent are 
most negatively affected by the acquisition announcement, with announcement returns being 1.93 percentage points lower compared 
to the competitors of stand-alone private targets, who benefit the most. 
We use several methods to illustrate the robustness of our findings. First, we show that our results hold for shorter and longer event 
windows and the addition of additional control variables. Furthermore, we consider the potential endogenous choice of target 
ownership type and alleviate the concern of biased estimates using an IV approach. Additionally, we test the underlying assumptions of 
our hypotheses and reject alternative explanations such as merger waves, size effects, information asymmetry, or acquirer hubris, 
which are associated with differences in ownership types. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of using precise competitor iden-
tification compared to SIC-based rivals and show that the inclusion of private acquirers in the sample does not alter the findings. 
This study contributes to the M&A literature in several ways. First, we examine an overlooked segment of the M&A market: 
competitors of non-listed or subsidiary targets. Few studies investigate rivals of M&As and typically focus on rivals of listed targets. 
Therefore, this study illuminates more of the M&A market and highlights the limited generalizability of prior findings to acquisitions of 
subsidiaries or non-listed firms. Second, we propose target ownership structure as a key determinant of competitor valuation effects. 
Different ownership structures involve various levels of agency problems and asset utilization, which are important in understanding 
competitor wealth effects around the announcement of acquisitions. Finally, the unique dataset constitutes a major empirical strength 
as it focuses on direct competitors rather than on broad industries, contributing to the recent call regarding precise competitor 
3 Akhigbe et al. (2003) have reviewed differences in industry effects following acquisitions of public versus private targets. However, rivals were 
identified based on industry classification (Value Line) and subsidiary targets were not included in the sample. Additionally, the rival return dif-
ferences for public and private targets were not tested in a multivariate setting.  
4 In this paper, rivals refer to all participants in an industry, typically identified through industry classification codes. Although some of the rival 
firms may be close competitors, others could be customers or suppliers or even unrelated organizations (Clougherty and Duso, 2009). Focusing on 
rivals rather than on competitors may bias the results. 
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identification (Gur and Greckhamer, 2019). Prior studies have typically used industry classification codes to identify rivals. While this 
approach is quick and straightforward, it is inaccurate, and this shortcoming drives the contradictory or mixed findings of prior studies. 
In addition, results based on industry codes could be biased due to the inclusion of customer or supplier effects. By studying firms that 
compete directly with acquirers and targets, the findings are cleaner and less biased by confounding industry trends. Our tests on both 
direct competitors and SIC-based rivals confirm this need for correct competitor identification. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Prior literature on M&A rivals 
Research on the impact of M&As on firms operating in the same industry has gained interest in recent decades. Early research in this 
domain has typically focused on gaining a deeper understanding of acquirer and target announcement returns, and rivals’ valuations 
have been analyzed to find evidence of collusion, buyer power, acquisition probability, hubris, or preemption as a motive for the 
acquisition (Eckbo, 1985; Fee and Thomas, 2004; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Song and Walkling, 2000; Akdogu, 2011). More 
recently, scholars have focused on the reactions of rivals and determinants of rivals’ returns following M&A announcements (Keil et al., 
2013; Clougherty and Duso, 2009; Gaur et al., 2013). This study adds to this stream of literature by investigating changes in direct 
competitors’ valuations following acquisition announcements of targets with different ownership structures. We begin with a brief 
overview of prior findings on rival valuation effects. 
Most studies on rival returns have focused on M&As of publicly listed, stand-alone targets, and have documented small positive 
returns for the rivals of public targets, which are explained by three potential mechanisms. First, fewer industry players post-M&A 
increase collusion potential or buyer power vis-à-vis suppliers, which should benefit rivals (Eckbo, 1983, 1985; Fee and Thomas, 
2004). Second, merger waves explain rivals being positively affected as an M&A within the industry increases the acquisition like-
lihood of other industry participants (Song and Walkling, 2000). Third, acquirer hubris can lead to value-destroying M&As for the 
acquirer, which provides rival firms an opportunity to improve their strategic position (Clougherty and Duso, 2011). However, other 
studies have identified negative wealth effects for rival firms, explained by intensified competition, efficiency improvements for the 
combining entities without positive spillover effects for rivals, pre-emptive merger motives, or industry-wide mis-valuations (Shahrur, 
2005; Clougherty and Duso, 2011; Keil et al., 2013; Derrien et al., 2020). These contrasting findings require further research on how 
M&A announcements affect rival wealth. 
Furthermore, the limited studies including targets with different ownership types have shown distinct implications for acquirer and 
target returns and for the distribution of gains between target and acquirer shareholders (Fuller et al., 2002; Mantecon, 2008). Firms 
with different ownership structures differ in terms of information asymmetry, agency risk, and access to financial markets (Fitza and 
Tihanyi, 2017); these are all potentially important considerations for M&A decision making and value effects. Therefore, this study 
theorizes on how target ownership structure differently impacts direct competitors by exploring the difference between publicly 
quoted and private targets and the difference between subsidiaries and stand-alone targets. 
2.2. Public versus private targets 
Within the context of horizontal acquisitions, this study argues that a competitor is more positively affected when a private target is 
acquired compared to when a public target is acquired. The acquirer has greater potential to create value from reducing agency 
problems when acquiring a public compared to a private target. Public targets face higher pre-acquisition agency risks than private 
targets as a result of separation between ownership and control (Golubov and Xiong, 2020). By design, ownership concentration is 
higher in private companies. Consequently, principal-agent conflicts (i.e., misalignment of interests between shareholders and man-
agers) are typically higher in public companies, particularly as principals and agents (managers) are often the same in private com-
panies. While private firms can hire agents to manage the company, the ownership concentration ensures stronger incentives for 
principals to monitor the agents closely, which should minimize agency conflicts. This limits the need for, and benefits of, the 
disciplining effect of a market for corporate control for private firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
According to the market for corporate control hypothesis (Manne, 1965), more efficient management teams replacing less efficient 
management teams creates value. Acquisitions of public companies should reduce agency costs and improve performance. In contrast, when 
a private firm is acquired by a public firm, the target transfers from a situation with a unity of control and close monitoring by its shareholders 
to one where it becomes a subsidiary of a public firm. This entails higher agency risks, thereby weakening the target’s position. 
These arguments may seem contradictory to the well-documented evidence that acquirers of private targets realize higher 
announcement returns than acquirers of public targets (Officer, 2007). However, the stronger positive announcement return of a 
private acquisition is driven by the fact that acquirers of private firms are faced with higher levels of information asymmetry, leading to 
fewer bidders and lower competition for the deal, which trigger lower target valuations and a lower acquisition premium, compared to 
public acquisitions (Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002; Akhigbe et al., 2003; Laamanen et al., 2014). This supports the recognition that 
the market for corporate control is less active for private compared to public targets. While this study argues that the acquisition of a 
private target might decrease its efficiency post-acquisition due to increased agency costs, acquiring a private target may nevertheless 
be a value-creating transaction for the acquirer, as the discount negotiated for private targets may offset the potential loss in value. 
Therefore, the announcement of a private target acquisition is good news for both the acquirer and its close competitors. In summary, 
competitors facing the acquisition of a public target will face stronger competition, while competitors facing the acquisition of a 
private target will face weakened competition after the acquisition. 
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As competitors will be more negatively affected following the acquisition of a public target compared to the acquisition of a private 
target, this should result in more negative competitor returns at the announcement of the acquisition of a public compared to a private 
target. Given that the disciplining force of the market for corporate control and the ensuing reduction of agency problems is especially 
relevant for public targets, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H1: Competitors of public targets experience lower returns compared to competitors of private targets upon announcement of the acquisition. 
2.3. Subsidiary versus stand-alone targets 
Further to being publicly listed or being private, a second important ownership dimension is whether the target is a stand-alone company 
or a subsidiary. Acquirers of subsidiaries have higher announcement returns compared to acquirers of stand-alone companies, explained by 
the higher potential synergy gains when acquiring a subsidiary (Laamanen et al., 2014), because the market for corporate control functions 
differently for stand-alone firms compared to subsidiaries. For a subsidiary to be acquired, parent companies have to put the subsidiary up for 
sale. A key motivation for selling a subsidiary is the incongruence between the subsidiary’s strategy, structure, or human capital and the 
overall company strategy (Lang et al., 1995). Parent companies typically sell non-core or less productive subsidiaries to improve productivity 
(Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002), while acquirers tend to have a better asset fit with the subsidiaries (compared to 
the parent firm) and expect to improve the asset utilization of the subsidiary (Laamanen et al., 2014; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). This 
supports the assumption that companies use acquisitions to improve asset utilization and increase shareholder wealth (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983). Subsidiaries are shifted from corporations with poor fit to new corporations with strong asset fit (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). The 
utilization of the acquired assets is expected to improve significantly, and the target will emerge as a stronger competitor post-M&A. In 
contrast, underperformance or weak asset fit as a motivation to sell is less applicable for deals involving stand-alone targets compared to those 
involving subsidiary targets (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001); stand-alone acquisitions can be driven by various reasons and improvement in 
asset utilization is only one potential motivation.5 Compared to subsidiary acquisitions, the improvement in asset utilization and increased 
asset fit will be less prominent in stand-alone target acquisitions. 
Due to better fit and improved asset utilization, the acquirer’s performance will improve more with a subsidiary acquisition 
compared to a stand-alone acquisition. Consequently, the acquisition of a subsidiary will more negatively affect competitors compared 
to the acquisition of a stand-alone target. The second hypothesis is therefore: 
H2: Competitors of subsidiary targets experience lower returns compared to competitors of stand-alone targets upon announcement of the 
acquisition. 
3. Institutional context of the study 
3.1. European commission (EC) procedure to identify direct competitors 
The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 1038 competitors in 228 large horizontal acquisitions analyzed by the EC between 1997 
and 2015. Since December 1989, one of the major roles of the EC has been to examine proposed acquisitions to prevent harmful effects 
on competition. M&A regulations require notification if the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of the merging parties exceeds €5 
billion and the individual turnover of at least two of the merging parties throughout the European Union (EU) exceeds €250 million.6 
Deals meeting any of these conditions are automatically screened by the EC (Phase One), and only when antitrust concerns arise, the 
deals are analyzed in Phase Two. 
Before formally notifying the EC, the merging companies typically start an informal exchange of information with EC officials. During 
this pre-notification phase, the entities provide information about product and geographical markets, customers, suppliers, and com-
petitors. The EC assigns a case team with country and industry experience to investigate and communicate with the interested parties. 
After the official notification is filed, Phase One commences, and the case team gathers information. The team sends requests for in-
formation to customers, suppliers, competitors, and other relevant parties identified by the merging companies. As part of the process, 
respondents must define the product market in which they are competing. The case team can solicit external industrial or economic experts to 
provide guidance. In addition, if any third party has competition concerns, they can communicate these to the EC. This allows the case team to 
collect as much information as possible on the parties involved in or affected by the proposed transaction and to perform an economic 
evaluation. Following this process, meetings are organized with the merging firms and all other parties involved for open discussions. The 
case team identifies any potential antitrust issues and the actions required, and its report is made public via the EC’s website.7 In cases of 
severe antitrust concerns, a more in-depth investigation is initiated (Phase Two), which postpones the transaction. 
5 Other hypotheses have been advanced to explain acquirers’ higher returns upon the acquisition announcement of a subsidiary target compared 
to a stand-alone target, such as fire sales by a distressed parent (Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002) or stronger acquirer bargaining power (Laamanen et al., 
2014). However, these are less relevant in explaining competitor returns as they mainly impact the price paid by the acquirer but not the 
competitive strength of the target post-acquisition. Nevertheless, the study controls for the impact of distressed parents by including pre-acquisition 
leverage as a control in the regression models.  
6 Alternatively, notification is also required with a combined worldwide turnover of €2,5 billion, a combined turnover of at least €100 million in 
three or more member states (with a turnover of at least €25 million for each of the merging firms in these member states), and an EU-turnover of at 
least €100 million for each of at least two merging firms.  
7 European Commission - Competition (europa.eu) https://ec.europe.eu/competition/ 
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3.2. Sample selection 
To test the hypotheses, competitors of horizontal acquisitions in manufacturing industries drawn from the transactions investigated 
by the EC (Phase One) were analyzed. The focus on deals investigated by the EC implies that the acquisitions in the sample are large, 
widely publicized transactions that attract the attention of industry analysts, business press, and competitors. Acquisitions that are not 
appropriately publicized could remain unnoticed by investors and create a bias toward finding zero abnormal returns (Aktas et al., 
2007). Additionally, the size requirement of the EC ensures that all deals in the sample are comparable with respect to size, irrespective 
of the target ownership type. Only 12 mergers were scrutinized under Phase Two; therefore, the sample is not affected by a selection 
Table 1 
Sample description.  
Panel A. Number of deals and competitors per year  
Deal Level Competitor level 
YEAR Nr. of deals Percent Nr. of competitors Percent 
1997 1 0.44% 3 0.29% 
1998 7 3.07% 22 2.12% 
1999 13 5.70% 54 5.20% 
2000 23 10.09% 113 10,00% 
2001 14 6.14% 74 7.13% 
2002 10 4.39% 38 3.66% 
2003 11 4.82% 44 4.24% 
2004 11 4.82% 54 5.20% 
2005 8 3.51% 49 4.72% 
2006 17 7.46% 81 7.80% 
2007 14 6.14% 66 6.36% 
2008 9 3.95% 33 3.18% 
2009 4 1.75% 17 1.64% 
2010 13 5.70% 88 8.48% 
2011 12 5.26% 53 5.11% 
2012 19 8.33% 84 8.09% 
2013 10 4.39% 36 3.47% 
2014 17 7.46% 74 7.13% 
2015 15 6.58% 55 5.30% 
Total 228  1038    
Panel B. Number of deals by acquirer country 
Acquirer Country Nr. of deals Percent 
United States 69 30% 
Germany 24 11% 
France 20 9% 
UK 20 9% 
Netherlands 12 5% 
Switzerland 12 5% 
Finland 11 5% 
Japan 10 4% 
Belgium 9 4% 
Sweden 8 4% 
Canada 8 4% 
Austria 4 2% 
Norway 4 2% 
Italy 3 1% 
Spain 2 1% 
Hong Kong 2 1% 
South Africa 2 1% 
Australia 1 <1% 
Denmark 1 <1% 
Ireland 1 <1% 
Israel 1 <1% 
India 1 <1% 
Mexico 1 <1% 
Malaysia 1 <1% 
Taiwan 1 <1%  
228  
Panel A reports the distribution of M&A deals included in our sample by year. The total number of competitors linked to those deals is also reported in 
the table. In Panel B the distribution of M&A deals by acquirer country is reported. The sample includes 228 deals that were announced between 1997 
and 2015, with acquirers originating from 25 different countries. 




Descriptive statistics.  
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for different (sub)samples  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
Full sample Public Private Stand-alone Subsidiary Public Private  
Subsidiary Stand-alone Subsidiary Stand-alone  
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Deal level N = 228 N = 82 N = 64 N = 19 N = 63 N = 127 N = 101 N = 146 N = 82 
HHI 0.41 0.18 0.37 0.16 0.41 0.20 0.43 0.20 0.45 0.18 0.43 0.19 0.38 0.17 0.39 0.18 0.44 0.18 
Number of competitors/deal 7.63 5.66 6.83 5.20 7.95 6.72 8.68 6.28 8.03 4.82 7.99 5.83 7.18 5.44 7.32 5.92 8.18 5.16 
Competing bid 33%  32%  44%  21%  27%  36%  30%  37%  26%  
M&A activity by year - industry 2.48 1.78 2.46 1.81 2.43 1.84 1.82 1.42 2.76 1.75 2.60 1.80 2.34 1.76 2.45 1.82 2.54 1.72 
Deal value 20.70 1.68 20.51 1.61 21.19 1.89 20.29 1.34 20.46 1.47 20.86 1.75 20.48 1.57 20.82 1.77 20.43 1.44 
Cash payment 63%  77%  59%  53%  54%  56%  72%  69%  54%  
Equity payment 5%  4%  13%  0%  0%  6%  3%  8%  0%  
Target level                   
Target initiative 26%  37%  17%  11%  24%  21%  32%  28%  21%  
Target/seller leverage 0.32 0.24 0.28 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.40 0.37 0.51 0.35 0.34 0.26 0.30 0.21 0.27 0.45 0.48 0.35 
Acquirer level                   
Acquirer size 16.25 1.39 16.32 1.41 16.15 1.34 16.52 1.74 16.19 1.34 16.17 1.34 16.36 1.47 16.25 1.38 16.26 1.43 
Acquirer sales growth 9.55% 0.19 9.76% 0.18 5.78% 0.18 20.48% 0.25 9.76% 0.18 7.77% 0.18 11.78% 0.20 8.03% 0.18 12.24% 0.21 
Acquirer CAR 1.25% 5.63% 1.72% 5.68% 1.19% 6.52% 0.17% 4.24% 1.05% 4.98% 1.12% 5.79% 1.41% 5.44% 1.48% 6.06% 0.83% 4.80% 
Non-European acquirer 43%  46%  34%  37%  48%  41%  45%  41%  45%  
Competitor level N = 1038 N = 408 N = 313 N = 82 N = 235 N = 548 N = 490 N = 721 N = 317 
U.S. competitor 27%  27%  28%  23%  28%  28%  26%  27%  27%  
ROW competitor 21%  23%  20%  18%  19%  20%  22%  22%  18%  
European competitor 52%  50%  52%  59%  53%  52%  52%  51%  55%  
Competitor size 15.73 1.83 15.86 1.75 15.70 1.85 15.76 2.06 15.54 1.87 15.63 1.86 15.85 1.80 15.79 1.79 15.60 1.92 
Competitor sales growth 9.47% 0.24 10.47% 0.23 8.64% 0.24 11.12% 0.30 8.22% 0.22 8.46% 0.23 10.58% 0.24 9.67% 0.23 9.01% 0.24  
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Panel B. Differences across subsamples  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Public vs. Private Stand-alone: Subsidiary: Subsidiary vs. Stand-alone Public: Private:  












Deal level             
HHI − 0.06 ¡2.29** − 0.04 − 1.12 − 0.06 − 1.35 − 0.05 ¡2.16** − 0.04 − 1.48 − 0.02 − 0.49 
Number of competitors/deal − 0.86 − 1.10 − 0.08 − 0.08 − 1.85 − 1.35 − 0.81 − 1.08 − 1.12 − 1.14 0.65 0.48 
Competing bid 12% 1.79* 17% 2.05** 11% 0.92 − 6% − 0.96 − 13% − 1.57 − 6% − 0.52 
M&A activity by year - industry − 0.10 − 0.39 − 0.33 − 1.03 0.64 1.45 − 0.26 − 1.09 0.03 0.09 ¡0.95 2.15** 
Deal value 0.39 1.45 0.73 2.17** 0.21 0.40 − 0.38 − 1.56 − 0.68 ¡2.22** − 0.16 0.32 
Cash payment 15% 2.30** 5% 0.54 24% 2.12** 16% 2.48** 18% 2.34** 1% 0.10 
Equity payment 8% 2.56* 13% 2.92*** 4% 0.85 − 3% − 1.18 − 9% − 2.04** 0%  
Target level             
Target initiative 8% 1.25 − 6% − 0.88 26% 2.20** 11% 1.90* 19% 2.53** − 13% 1.25 
Target/seller leverage − 0.21 ¡5.46*** − 0.25 ¡4.95*** − 0.12 ¡1.88* − 0.05 − 1.28 0.03 1.01 − 0.10 − 0.86 
Acquirer level             
Acquirer size 0.014 0.07 0.033 0.14 0.20 0.53 − 0.19 − 1.01 − 0.17 − 0.72 − 0.34 − 0.88 
Acquirer sales growth 4.21% 1.60 3.98% 1.23 10.72% 2.12** − 4.01% − 1.57 − 3.99% − 1.31 − 10.73% ¡2.04** 
Acquirer CAR 0.65% 0.81 0.15% 0.14 1.56% 1.11 0.29% 0.37 0.53% 0.51 − 0.88% − 0.69 
Non-European acquirer − 4% − 0.59 − 13% − 1.52 9% 0.75 4% 0.55 12% 1.46 − 11% − 0.83 
Competitor level             
U.S. competitor 1% 0.24 0% 0.08 4% 0.85 − 2% − 0.61 − 1% − 0.23 − 6% − 0.99 
ROW competitor 3% 1.15 1% 0.40 5% 1.01 2% 0.96 3% 0.87 − 1% − 0.19 
European competitor − 4% − 1.15 − 1% − 0.25 − 10% − 1.59 − 1% − 0.24 − 2% − 0.51 7% 1.03 
Competitor size 0.19 1.54 0.16 0.98 0.10 0.48 0.21 1.82* 0.16 1.18 0.22 0.88 
Competitor sales growth 0.7% 0.41 0.4% 0.21 − 0.7% − 0.22 2.1% 1.42 1.8% 1.02 2.9% 0.93 
This table provides an overview of the control variables used in the regression analyses. We distinguish between control variables at the deal-, target-, acquirer-, and competitor-level. Panel A presents the 
mean and standard deviation of the variables for the full sample as well as the different subsamples according to target ownership type. In Panel B differences in means between the subgroups are tested 
using a Pearson chi-squared test for categorical variables and a T-test for continuous variables. Accordingly, the z-stat or t-stat is reported. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. 
V. M




Correlation matrix.  
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
(1)Competitor CAR 1               
(2) HHI 0.0329 1              
(3) Number of competitors/deal − 0.0244 ¡0.189 1             
(4) Competing bid ¡0.0633 ¡0.1327 0.1368 1            
(5) M&A activity/year-industry 0.0294 ¡0.1099 0.063 − 0.0225 1           
(6) Target initiative − 0.0006 0.0323 0.1056 0.3395 − 0.0446 1          
(7) Target/seller leverage − 0.0307 0.174 − 0.0389 ¡0.0865 ¡0.1124 − 0.0316 1         
(8) Acquirer size 0.0425 ¡0.2235 0.0917 0.0213 0.0778 0.015 − 0.0495 1        
(9) Acquirer sales growth − 0.0444 − 0.0089 ¡0.0843 ¡0.104 − 0.0113 ¡0.1078 ¡0.0691 ¡0.1865 1       
(10) Acquirer CAR 0.0914 0.0056 0.1038 ¡0.0911 − 0.0166 0.1255 0.0585 ¡0.2346 − 0.0057 1      
(11) Non-European acquirer − 0.0019 0.0687 − 0.0487 ¡0.0846 0.0789 0.0382 0.0229 ¡0.1311 − 0.0001 0.0454 1     
(12) U.S. competitor ¡0.0648 − 0.0454 0.0314 0.0588 0.0489 0.0092 ¡0.0658 0.0009 − 0.0483 − 0.0113 0.0744 1    
(13) ROW competitor 0.0218 ¡0.0657 0.033 − 0.013 − 0.0589 0.055 0.0123 − 0.0591 0.0186 0.0622 0.1548 ¡0.3117 1   
(14) Competitor size 0.0012 ¡0.2049 ¡0.0843 0.0401 0.0752 0.0186 − 0.0618 0.1443 − 0.0232 − 0.0324 0.012 0.1167 ¡0.0967 1  
(15) Competitor sales growth − 0.0302 0.0095 ¡0.1132 − 0.0393 − 0.0022 ¡0.0781 − 0.0065 ¡0.1024 0.2702 − 0.0123 0.0233 0.0096 0.0794 − 0.0241 1 
This table reports the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between the dependent variable and the control variables used in the regression analyses. 
Correlations significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold. 
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bias with respect to potential antitrust issues.8 Furthermore, the deals that underwent a Phase Two investigation included the four 
types of target ownership, so there is no bias in terms of increased likelihood of scrutiny for one ownership type over another. 
A major advantage of sampling transactions analyzed by the EC is that their experts identify close competitors on a case-by-case 
basis and consider both geographical and product markets. In previous research, rivals have been typically identified as firms with 
the same industry classification code. Following the EC procedure, the study identifies an average of 7.63 direct competitors per deal, 
of which 4.55 are publicly listed (i.e., 1038 competitors in 228 acquisitions) compared to the average of 75.55 sector peers, based on 
industry codes, as reported by Fee and Thomas (2004). As competitors were accurately identified by EC experts on a case-by-case basis, 
this sample provides a more precise comparison and has notable strength. 
From October 1997 to December 2015,9 831 horizontal acquisitions of European targets in manufacturing industries underwent a 
mandatory investigation by the EC. To ensure that only horizontal acquisitions are included in the study, all EC files were examined 
meticulously. Hence, we discarded deals for which the EC reports referred to vertical ties, upstream or downstream, between the 
acquirer and the target. Additionally, deals in which institutional investors or other financial institutions were involved as acquiring 
firms were removed. Acquisitions then had to fulfill additional criteria to be included in the final sample (see Appendix A). Firstly, 
acquirers had to be publicly listed companies since stock price data was needed for the event study. Secondly, all joint ventures and 
acquisitions in which the merging parties were already involved prior to the acquisition announcement were eliminated to exclude 
anticipation by the stock market and to make deals more comparable. Thirdly, privatizations, minority acquisitions, and cases with 
multiple acquisition announcements in the event window were removed to reduce potential confounding effects (Fee and Thomas, 
2004). This reduced the sample to 568 relevant deals. Finally, all necessary data on the deal and the firm had to be available. This 
reduced the final sample to 228 acquisition announcements10; of these cases, 64 (28%) involve public stand-alone targets, 63 (28%) 
private stand-alone targets, and 101 (44%) subsidiaries, of which 82 (36%) had a public parent and 19 (8%) a private parent. This 
balanced distribution across target ownership types highlights the importance of private targets and subsidiaries in the M&A market, 
even when focusing on large scale acquisitions. In addition, 57% of all acquirers were European firms, compared to 43% non-European 
acquirers. Interestingly, 30% of the targets in our sample were acquired by U.S. firms, whereas, acquirers from Germany and France 
represented another 20% of the deals (Table 1). 
The EC files identified 1108 public and 524 private competitors of the 228 acquisitions. In line with previous studies (e.g., Song and 
Walkling, 2000; Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005), only publicly traded competitors were included since the valuations of private 
firms were not continuously available and therefore neither were the announcement effects. Of the 1108 public competitors, 70 were 
eliminated because the stocks were not frequently traded11 or because of missing stock prices.12 This reduced the number of listed 
competitors in the study to 1038, or an average of 4.55 competitors per deal. Of these, 313 (30%) are related to public stand-alone 
targets, 235 (23%) to private stand-alone targets, 408 (39%) to subsidiary targets of public parents, and 82 (8%) to subsidiary tar-
gets of private parents. 
The data from the EC files were complemented with acquisition announcement dates. The event dates were hand-collected and 
Table 4 
Announcement returns to competitors.  
Competitor CAR [− 2, +2] Public Private Entire sample T-test 
Public /vs/ private  
% 
Pos 
Mean T-stat % 
Pos 
Mean T-stat % 
Pos 
Mean T-stat Difference T-stat 
Stand-alone 47% − 0.09% − 0.34 61% 0.77% 2.93*** 53% 0.28% 1.51 ¡0.86% ¡2.30** 
Subsidiary 46% ¡0.43% ¡2.13** 51% 0.24% 0.67 47% ¡0.31% ¡1.76* − 0.66% − 1.42 
Entire Sample 46% ¡0.28% ¡1.75* 58% 0.63% 2.93*** 50% 0.01% 0.01 ¡0.91% ¡3.27*** 
T-test subsidiary /vs/ stand- 
alone 
Difference T-stat Difference T-stat Difference T-stat   
− 0.34% − 1.06 − 0.53% − 1.09 ¡0.59% ¡2.29**   
This table reports competitor 5-day CARs along the two-by-two distinction on target ownership type: public versus private and subsidiary versus 
stand-alone. The percentage of positive CARs for competitors is reported. The mean differences between the CARs of competitors of publicly traded 
and privately held targets and between the CARs of competitors of subsidiaries and stand-alone targets are also reported. Cumulative abnormal 
returns are computed using the market model. The t-statistics are computed following Dodd and Warner’s (1983) test of significance. *** p < 0.01; ** 
p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. 
8 These deals are retained in the sample, since the acquisition announcement date precedes the announcement of a Phase Two investigation. 
Robustness checks excluding these deals yield qualitatively similar results.  
9 Due to data constraints, the data set covers deals announced between October 1997 and December 2015. The deal information provided by the 
Zephyr database starts in 1997. A detailed overview of the sample selection process can be found in Appendix A.  
10 Comparing our final sample of 228 deals to the 568 relevant deals shows no significant differences with respect to deal size or relative size of the 
target compared to the acquirer. Hence, we can rule out selection bias due to the availability of the necessary data.  
11 An infrequently traded stock is traded on fewer than 50 days during the window (− 300, 5). These are excluded following McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997).  
12 These competitors do not have stock prices during the window (− 300, 5). This can be due to the fact that the competitor was delisted 
immediately after the acquisition announcement or the competitor was only listed on the stock exchange after the start of the estimation period. This 
procedure follows Clougherty and Duso (2009). 




Multivariate regression analysis of competitor returns.  
Panel A. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)   
Entire sample Subsidiary Stand-alone Entire sample Public Private   
VARIABLES Entire 
sample 
H1: Public /vs/ 
Private 
H1: Public /vs/ 
Private 
H1: Public /vs/ 
Private 
H2: Subsidiary /vs/ 
Stand-alone 
H2: Subsidiary /vs/ 
Stand-alone 






Private (stand-alone or 
subsidiary of private 
parent)  
0.0145***         
(0.0039)        
Subsidiary - Private parent   0.0183**     − 0.0048 0.0037   
(0.0079)     (0.0060) (0.0083) 
Stand-alone - Private    0.0117**          
(0.0048)      
Subsidiary     ¡0.0090*** ¡0.0100*** ¡0.0165*        
(0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0093)   
Subsidiary - Public parent        ¡0.0193*** ¡0.0196***        
(0.0047) (0.0065) 
Stand-alone - Public        ¡0.0119** ¡0.0140**         
(0.0050) (0.0069) 
HHI 0.0081 0.0015 − 0.0005 − 0.0199 0.0024 0.0009 − 0.0147 − 0.0022 0.0073  
(0.0108) (0.0105) (0.0194) (0.0132) (0.0105) (0.0123) (0.0167) (0.0105) (0.0182) 
Number of competitors − 0.0004 ¡0.0005* − 0.0004 − 0.0003 ¡0.0005* ¡0.0008** 0.0004 ¡0.0006** − 0.0002 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Competing bid − 0.0048 − 0.0036 − 0.0044 ¡0.0100** ¡0.0062* ¡0.0077* 0.0035 − 0.0049 − 0.0077  
(0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0099) (0.0035) (0.0053) 
M&A activity/year-industry 0.0003 0.0002 − 0.0007 0.0034*** − 0.0001 − 0.0013 0.0015 0.0000 0.0024 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0015) 
Target initiative 0.0004 0.0014 − 0.0008 0.0050 0.0025 − 0.0009 − 0.0029 0.0031 0.0034  
(0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0085) (0.0036) (0.0051) 
Target/seller leverage ¡0.0159* ¡0.0250*** ¡0.0249* ¡0.0203** ¡0.0146* ¡0.0288* − 0.0130 ¡0.0227*** ¡0.0298**  
(0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0139) (0.0094) (0.0082) (0.0147) (0.0173) (0.0085) (0.0120) 
Acquirer size 0.0016 0.0011 0.0044** − 0.0013 0.0018 0.0030** − 0.0023 0.0013 0.0005  
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0017) 
Acquirer sales growth − 0.0081 − 0.0106 − 0.0110 − 0.0087 − 0.0033 0.0073 − 0.0211 − 0.0069 − 0.0057 
(0.0117) (0.0111) (0.0155) (0.0158) (0.0122) (0.0117) (0.0254) (0.0115) (0.0148) 
Acquirer CAR 0.0731** 0.0759*** 0.0320 0.1287*** 0.0762*** 0.1028*** − 0.0295 0.0782*** 0.0345  
(0.0296) (0.0289) (0.0422) (0.0351) (0.0284) (0.0285) (0.0832) (0.0280) (0.0418) 
Non-European acquirer ¡0.0081* ¡0.0088** − 0.0004 − 0.0066 ¡0.0087** − 0.0030 ¡0.0206*** ¡0.0092** − 0.0033 
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0069) (0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0072) (0.0041) (0.0054) 
U.S. competitor − 0.0044 − 0.0045 ¡0.0105** − 0.0027 − 0.0047 − 0.0040 ¡0.0104** − 0.0047   
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0038)  
ROW competitor 0.0009 0.0015 0.0073 − 0.0014 0.0011 0.0042 − 0.0062 0.0016  
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5 (continued ) 
Panel A. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
(0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0057) (0.0063) (0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0072) (0.0041)  
Competitor size − 0.0000 − 0.0000 − 0.0003 0.0011 0.0000 − 0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 − 0.0003  
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
Competitor sales growth − 0.0044 − 0.0048 − 0.0013 − 0.0129 − 0.0049 − 0.0046 0.0066 − 0.0052 − 0.0027 
(0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0089) (0.0095) (0.0067) (0.0081) (0.0113) (0.0064) (0.0099) 
Constant − 0.0174 − 0.0176 ¡0.0711** 0.0062 − 0.0193 − 0.0280 0.0487 − 0.0058 0.0205  
(0.0245) (0.0243) (0.0357) (0.0385) (0.0253) (0.0312) (0.0463) (0.0257) (0.0323) 
Observations 942 942 433 509 942 653 290 942 491 
R-squared 0.0724 0.0880 0.1778 0.1531 0.0808 0.1220 0.2071 0.0925 0.1234 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Panel B: Wald test of parameters (Model 8) 
Parameter 1 Parameter 2 Wald Test  
coefficient  coefficient F-value p-value 
Subsidiary public parent − 0.0193 Subsidiary private parent − 0.0048 6.66 0.011 ** 
Subsidiary public parent − 0.0193 Public stand-alone − 0.0119 3.67 0.057 * 
Subsidiary private parent − 0.0048 Public stand-alone − 0.0119 1.67 0.198       
Panel A of this table analyzes the impact of target ownership type on the CAR of competing firms following an acquisition announcement, using a 5-day event window [− 2, +2]. We use OLS regressions 
and include industry (using the Fama-French industry classification) and year fixed effects. Models 1, 2, 5, and 8 include all deals, whereas Models 3, 4, 6, and 7 are based on subsamples of deals, selected 
on target ownership type (public /vs private and subsidiary /vs/ stand-alone). In model 9 we include all deals, but restrict the competitors to European firms. Control variables at the deal-, target-, 
acquirer- and competitor-level are included to control for potential alternative explanations. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are reported 
between the parentheses. Panel B reports an additional Wald test to compare the coefficients of the ownership dummies in model 8. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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cross-checked across multiple sources, including the business press, Factiva, and company websites. Deal information was obtained 
from the Zephyr database, which is commercialized by Bureau van Dijk and consists of detailed information on over 500,000 M&As 
worldwide. Zephyr offers better coverage of the European M&A market compared to the SDC Platinum database of Refinitiv. Ac-
counting data were retrieved from the Orbis and Datastream databases and market data (including stock price returns and a market 
index) from Datastream. The Orbis database, also commercialized by Bureau van Dijk, is an exhaustive global database with ac-
counting data for over 11 million public and private companies in 41 European countries (Fitza and Tihanyi, 2017). All items are 
presented in a uniform format across various European countries to allow for reasonable cross-border analysis. Additionally, infor-
mation on variables, such as location, was gathered from company websites and the press. 
Table 6 
Two stage regression model: instrumenting private target.   
First Step First Stage 2SLS Second Stage 2SLS 
VARIABLES Probit 
Private (=1) 
Probability of private target Competitor CAR 
Fraction of private companies − 1.4207**   
(0.6666)   
Predicted probability of private target  0.8060***    
(0.1463)  
Private (Instrumented)   0.0515**    
(0.0206) 
HHI 2.2259*** 0.0874 − 0.0252**  
(0.3178) (0.0986) (0.0125) 
Number of competitors 0.0128 0.0005 − 0.0006**  
(0.0108) (0.0026) (0.0003) 
Competing bid − 0.2452* − 0.0082 − 0.0031  
(0.1379) (0.0323) (0.0037) 
M&A activity/year-industry − 0.0420 − 0.0019 0.0011  
(0.0377) (0.0085) (0.0010) 
Target initiative − 0.3804*** − 0.0263 0.0066  
(0.1457) (0.0361) (0.0043) 
Target/seller leverage 2.7447*** 0.1169 − 0.0470***  
(0.3384) (0.1184) (0.0154) 
Acquirer size 0.1360*** 0.0102 − 0.0007  
(0.0437) (0.0111) (0.0014) 
Acquirer sales growth 1.1426*** 0.0466 − 0.0195*  
(0.3810) (0.0907) (0.0106) 
Acquirer CAR − 1.8657* − 0.0057 0.0932***  
(1.1034) (0.2444) (0.0277) 
Non-European acquirer − 0.1038 − 0.0014 − 0.0054  
(0.1824) (0.0406) (0.0046) 
U.S. competitor − 0.0914 − 0.0040 − 0.0038  
(0.1325) (0.0305) (0.0035) 
ROW competitor − 0.1479 − 0.0112 0.0044  
(0.1479) (0.0349) (0.0040) 
Competitor size − 0.0267 − 0.0006 0.0003  
(0.0308) (0.0073) (0.0008) 
Competitor sales growth − 0.0004 − 0.0048 − 0.0029  
(0.2493) (0.0576) (0.0065) 
Constant (− 3.3545*** − 0.2431 0.0457  
(1.2647) (0.2613) (0.0325) 
Observations 908 908 908 
Pseudo-R2 0.3656   
F-Test for excluded instrument  30.3478 ***  
Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity   3.3982 
p-value (Wu-Hausman test)   0.0656* 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the results of the Two Stage Least Squares analysis to tackle the potential endogeneity concerns. Following Golubov and Xiong 
(2020) we use a three step approach to deal with the binary nature of the endogenous variable (Private target). In the first step we run a probit model 
(column 1), in which the dependent variable, the likelihood of acquiring a private target, is predicted by the fraction of private companies in the same 
industry. The predicted probabilities from the first step are used in the first stage of the 2SLS model (column 2). In the last column, the second stage of 
the 2SLS model is reported in which the instrumented private target variable is included to predict the competitors’ CAR[− 2,+2]. We include industry 
(using the Fama-French industry classification) and year fixed effects as well as control variables at the deal-, target-, acquirer- and competitor-level. 
A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are reported between the parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p <
0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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4. Method of analysis 
The dependent variable in the analyses is the competitor’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the M&A announcement. 
Following previous research, the standard market model is used to compute the benchmark return in the event study (Brown and 
Warner, 1985). The S&P 500 index is used as the market index, but similar findings are obtained when using the MSCI World index. 
The coefficients of the market model are estimated over a 240-day trading period ending 60 days prior to the announcement date. 
Following prior studies (Fuller et al., 2002; Gaur et al., 2013), a short five-day event window [− 2, +2] around the announcement 
date is used to reduce noise. As robustness checks, the same analyses are performed on shorter and longer event windows to control for 
a potential price run-up or a slower market reaction. Additional robustness tests are performed using portfolios of rival returns (Eckbo, 
1983; Akhigbe and Madura, 1999). 
The main independent variables of interest in the multivariate regression models explaining the CARs are dummy variables used to 
distinguish between competitors of different types of target. Private distinguishes between public and private targets (stand-alone or 
subsidiaries of a private parent) and takes the value of one for competitors of private targets and zero for competitors of public targets. 
A second dummy variable, Subsidiary, takes the value of one for competitors of subsidiary targets and zero for competitors of stand- 
Table 7 
Multivariate regression analysis of competitor returns – Alternative event windows.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Entire sample Entire sample Entire sample Entire sample Entire sample Entire sample  
[− 10;+10] [− 10;+10] [− 5;+5] [− 5;+5] [− 1;+1] [− 1;+1] 
VARIABLES H1: Public /vs/ 
Private 
H2: Subsidiary /vs/ 
Stand-alone 
H1: Public /vs/ 
Private 
H2: Subsidiary /vs/ 
Stand-alone 
H1: Public /vs/ 
Private 
H2: Subsidiary /vs/ 
Stand-alone 
Private (stand-alone or 
subsidiary of private 
parent) 
0.0143*  0.0130**  0.0074**  
(0.0076)  (0.0056)  (0.0031)  
Subsidiary  ¡0.0175**  ¡0.0092*  ¡0.0068***   
(0.0068)  (0.0055)  (0.0025) 
HHI 0.0357* 0.0308 − 0.0013 − 0.0011 − 0.0052 − 0.0062  
(0.0213) (0.0230) (0.0160) (0.0170) (0.0082) (0.0079) 
Number of competitors − 0.0002 − 0.0004 − 0.0006 − 0.0007 − 0.0001 − 0.0002  
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Competing bid − 0.0001 − 0.0036 − 0.0045 − 0.0068 ¡0.0061** ¡0.0076***  
(0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
M&A activity/year-industry 0.0013 0.0004 − 0.0005 − 0.0010 0.0012* 0.0008  
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Target initiative − 0.0016 0.0014 0.0038 0.0049 0.0051* 0.0061**  
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0027) (0.0029) 
Target/seller leverage ¡0.0449** ¡0.0344** ¡0.0305** ¡0.0216* ¡0.0119* − 0.0067  
(0.0194) (0.0171) (0.0136) (0.0124) (0.0072) (0.0064) 
Acquirer size 0.0013 0.0020 0.0026 0.0032 0.0016* 0.0020**  
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Acquirer sales growth 0.0068 0.0166 0.0078 0.0138 − 0.0039 0.0002  
(0.0280) (0.0276) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0095) (0.0099) 
Acquirer CAR 0.1668** 0.1665** 0.1259** 0.1243** 0.0782*** 0.0777***  
(0.0722) (0.0732) (0.0486) (0.0481) (0.0274) (0.0262) 
Non-European acquirer 0.0066 0.0058 0.0055 0.0050 − 0.0035 − 0.0039  
(0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0074) (0.0076) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
U.S. competitor − 0.0084 − 0.0085 − 0.0076 − 0.0077 − 0.0017 − 0.0018  
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0030) (0.0029) 
ROW competitor 0.0144* 0.0147* 0.0036 0.0035 − 0.0000 − 0.0000  
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
Competitor size 0.0018 0.0018 − 0.0002 − 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000  
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Competitor sales growth 0.0007 0.0012 0.0023 0.0026 0.0075 0.0078  
(0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Constant 0.0186 0.0141 − 0.0110 − 0.0142 ¡0.0326* ¡0.0346*  
(0.0507) (0.0523) (0.0404) (0.0429) (0.0189) (0.0186) 
Observations 942 942 942 942 942 942 
R-squared 0.0787 0.0836 0.0638 0.0621 0.0731 0.0743 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table analyzes the impact of target ownership type on the CAR of competing firms following an acquisition announcement for different event 
windows. In model 1 and 2 we use a 21-day event window [− 10, +10], in model 3 and 4 an 11-day event window [− 5, +5] is studied, while a 3-day 
event window [− 1, +1] is used in model 5 and 6. We use OLS regressions and include industry (using the Fama-French industry classification) and 
year fixed effects. Control variables at the deal-, target-, acquirer- and competitor-level are included to control for potential alternative explanations. 
A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are reported between the parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p <
0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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alone targets. Finally, four dummies are inserted to capture possible combinations of public versus private status, and subsidiary versus 
stand-alone status (i.e., Subsidiary-private parent, Subsidiary-public parent, Stand-alone private, and Stand-alone public). The regression 
analyses control for deal, target, acquirer, and competitor characteristics. Table 2 provide the descriptive statistics of the control 
variables. 
At the deal level, the study controls for industry concentration and industry size by including the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index13 
(HHI) based on sales in the year before the deal and the number of public and private competitors. Consistent with prior arguments of 
precise competitor identification, the competition measures are based on the competitors identified by the EC, not on industry clas-
sifications. The mean HHI14 is 0.41 and the mean number of competitors (public and private) per deal is 7.63. A slightly higher market 
concentration is observed in deals with private targets compared to public targets (p-value = 0.02) and in deals with stand-alone 
compared to subsidiary targets (p-value = 0.03). The dummy variable Competing bid is equal to one if the target received more 
than one bid and zero otherwise. One third of the targets received more than one bid, and as expected, more public stand-alone targets 
(44%) received more than one bid compared to private stand-alone targets (28%) (p-value = 0.04). To control for potential merger 
waves, the natural logarithm of the number of deals per year and industry is included. On average, 50 deals are announced within the 
same industry15 and year. 
At the target level, the dummy Target initiative is equal to one if the target initiated the deal, which occurs in 26% of the deals, and 
zero otherwise. As expected, the probability of a deal being initiated by the target is significantly higher for subsidiaries (32%) 
compared to stand-alone targets (21%) (p-value = 0.06), and subsidiaries of public parents (37%) are also more likely to initiate the 
deal than subsidiaries of private parents (11%) (p-value = 0.03). To control for distress motives Target firm leverage is added, which is 
Table 8 
Multivariate regression analysis of competitor returns – Portfolios of competitor returns.   
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES H1: Public /vs/ Private H2: Subsidiary /vs/ Stand-alone 
Private (stand-alone or subsidiary of private parent) 0.0093***   
(0.0035)  
Subsidiary  ¡0.0066**   
(0.0031) 
HHI 0.0020 0.0023  
(0.0099) (0.0099) 
Number of Competitors − 0.0001 − 0.0001  
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
Competing bid − 0.0050 ¡0.0069**  
(0.0031) (0.0031) 
M&A activity/year-industry 0.0008 0.0007  
(0.0008) (0.0008) 
Target initiative 0.0020 0.0030  
(0.0032) (0.0034) 
Target/seller leverage ¡0.0167** ¡0.0117*  
(0.0068) (0.0063) 
Acquirer size 0.0000 0.0000  
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
Acquirer sales growth 0.0022 0.0026  
(0.0028) (0.0028) 
Acquirer CAR 0.0727** 0.0666**  
(0.0307) (0.0296) 
Non-European acquirer 0.0002 − 0.0002  
(0.0033) (0.0033) 
Constant 0.0006 0.0055  
(0.0058) (0.0059) 
Observations 227 227 
R-squared 0.0987 0.0849 
This table analyzes the impact of target ownership type on the CAR of the portfolio of competing firms following an acquisition announcement, using 
a 5-day event window [− 2, +2]. Using portfolios of competitors discards the potential impact of outlier cases and controls for cross-correlation 
between competitor abnormal returns. Control variables at the deal-, target-, and acquirer-level are included to control for potential alternative 
explanations. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are reported between the parentheses. *** p 
< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
13 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated for each M&A transaction as the sum of squared market shares of all competitors (public and 
private). Market share is measured as sales of the firm in the year prior to the M&A announcement divided by the total sales of all firms (public and 
private competitors and acquirers) in that product market in the year prior to the M&A announcement.  
14 Given the high average HHI index, due to the precise competitor identification, we perform an additional robustness test (Table 9) using acquirer 
and competitor market share.  
15 The M&A activity per year and industry is computed based on the number of deal announcements in the same 4-digit SIC code, using the Zephyr 
database. 




Multivariate regression analysis of competitor returns – Additional control variables.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES H1: Public/vs/ 
Private 












H2: Subsidiary /vs/ 
Stand-alone 
Private (stand-alone or 
subsidiary of private parent) 
0.0141***  0.0182***  0.0150***  0.0127***  
(0.0038)  (0.0047)  (0.0037)  (0.0044)  
Subsidiary  ¡0.0083***  ¡0.0094**  ¡0.0090***  ¡0.0093**   
(0.0031)  (0.0037)  (0.0031)  (0.0038) 
Deal value   0.0017 0.0005        
(0.0014) (0.0016)     
Cash Payment   0.0046 0.0041        
(0.0044) (0.0048)     
Mixed Payment   − 0.0018 − 0.0039        
(0.0078) (0.0082)     
Acquirer market share     0.0168 0.0159        
(0.0141) (0.0133)   
Competitor market share     − 0.0061 − 0.0048        
(0.0073) (0.0074)   
HHI above median     0.0010 0.0019        
(0.0038) (0.0039)   
Relative size       0.0006 0.0006        
(0.0005) (0.0006) 
Acquirer profitability pre-M&A      − 0.0075 − 0.0076        
(0.0387) (0.0411) 
Competitor profitability pre-M&A      0.0204 0.0183        
(0.0280) (0.0282) 
HHI − 0.0028 − 0.0013 0.0051 0.0087   0.0067 0.0049  
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0117)   (0.0131) (0.0129) 
Number of competitors − 0.0003 − 0.0003 ¡0.0009*** ¡0.0007** ¡0.0005* ¡0.0005* ¡0.0007** ¡0.0006*  
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Competing bid − 0.0047 ¡0.0071** ¡0.0071** ¡0.0078** − 0.0027 − 0.0052 − 0.0043 ¡0.0066*  
(0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0037) 
M&A activity /year-industry − 0.0000 − 0.0004 0.0001 − 0.0001 0.0002 − 0.0002 0.0009 0.0007 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Target initiative 0.0031 0.0040 − 0.0012 0.0012 0.0005 0.0016 − 0.0032 − 0.0011  
(0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0044) 
Target/seller leverage ¡0.0207** − 0.0110 ¡0.0290*** − 0.0119 ¡0.0262*** ¡0.0154* ¡0.0228** − 0.0118  
(0.0084) (0.0079) (0.0102) (0.0093) (0.0089) (0.0082) (0.0090) (0.0089) 
Acquirer size 0.0003 0.0009 0.0018 0.0029** − 0.0000 0.0008 0.0029* 0.0034**  
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 9 (continued )  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES H1: Public/vs/ 
Private 












H2: Subsidiary /vs/ 
Stand-alone 
Acquirer sales growth − 0.0152 − 0.0091 0.0061 0.0097 − 0.0124 − 0.0048 0.0039 0.0095  
(0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0142) (0.0160) (0.0107) (0.0118) (0.0133) (0.0146) 
Acquirer CAR   0.0987*** 0.1047*** 0.0775*** 0.0790*** 0.1443*** 0.1385***    
(0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0288) (0.0281) (0.0316) (0.0321) 
Non-European acquirer ¡0.0080** ¡0.0077* ¡0.0101** − 0.0080 ¡0.0084** ¡0.0082** − 0.0070 − 0.0071 
(0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0051) (0.0049) 
U.S. competitor − 0.0053 − 0.0054 − 0.0036 − 0.0041 − 0.0046 − 0.0049 − 0.0051 − 0.0043  
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0045) 
ROW competitor 0.0013 0.0009 0.0007 0.0003 0.0014 0.0010 0.0004 0.0008  
(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0047) 
Competitor size 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0008 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005  
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Competitor sales growth − 0.0044 − 0.0044 − 0.0104 − 0.0102 − 0.0043 − 0.0046 ¡0.0127* ¡0.0126*  
(0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0074) 
Constant − 0.0041 − 0.0055 − 0.0484 − 0.0442 − 0.0152 − 0.0160 ¡0.0578* ¡0.0567*  
(0.0240) (0.0249) (0.0380) (0.0396) (0.0234) (0.0250) (0.0322) (0.0335) 
Observations 974 974 804 804 944 944 686 686 
R-squared 0.0764 0.0685 0.1064 0.0936 0.0912 0.0829 0.1129 0.1083 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table analyzes the impact of target ownership type on the CAR of competing firms following an acquisition announcement, using a 5-day event window [− 2, +2]. Models 1, 2, 5, and 8 include all 
deals, whereas Models 3, 4, 6, and 7 are based on subsamples of deals, selected on target ownership type (public /vs private and subsidiary /vs/ stand-alone). Control variables at the deal-, target-, 
acquirer- and competitor-level are included to control for potential alternative explanations. In model 1 and 2 we exclude acquirer CAR, in model 3 and 4 we add method of payment and deal value as 
controls. To rule out differences in market structure, acquirer and competitor market share are included in model 5 and 6. In models 7 and 8 acquirer and competitor pre-M&A profitability are included as 
well as relative size. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix B. We use OLS regressions and include industry (using the Fama-French industry classification) and year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are reported between the parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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replaced by leverage of the parent company in case of a subsidiary acquisition (Laamanen et al., 2014). In line with capital structure 
literature (Brav, 2009), a significantly (p = 0.00) higher leverage for private targets is observed compared to public targets, especially 
in the stand-alone subsample. 
With regard to acquirers, the study includes the acquirer’s size and sales growth.16 The average size of the acquirer amounts to €11.31 
billion in assets with an average sales growth of 9.55%. We observe a significantly higher sales growth for acquirers of subsidiaries with 
private parents compared to acquirers of subsidiaries with public parents. Furthermore, the acquirer’s CAR surrounding the 
announcement date (five-day event window [− 2, +2]) is considered. Following previous studies on the European M&A market 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2011), there are small positive abnormal returns of 1.41% for acquirers of subsidiary targets and 1.12% 
for acquirers of stand-alone targets. However, no significant differences are observed for acquirers of targets with different ownership 
types. A further dummy equal to one if the acquirer is non-European and zero for European acquirers is included. Of the acquirers, 57% 
are European; this proportion is not significantly different for different target types. 
At the competitor level, the study includes a dummy equal to one for U.S. competitors and a dummy equal to one for competitors 
Table 10 
Multivariate regression analysis of competitor returns – Governance problems in public targets.   
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES Public standalone Public standalone 
CEO also Chairperson ¡0.0104**   
(0.0051)  
CEO replaced post M&A  ¡0.0111*   
(0.0064) 
HHI − 0.0245 − 0.0121  
(0.0172) (0.0175) 
Number of competitors − 0.0005 ¡0.0007*  
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
Competing bid − 0.0045 0.0061  
(0.0056) (0.0071) 
M&A activity/year-industry − 0.0008 − 0.0005  
(0.0013) (0.0013) 
Target initiative − 0.0087 ¡0.0121*  
(0.0065) (0.0072) 
Target/seller leverage 0.0001 0.0116  
(0.0154) (0.0157) 
Acquirer size 0.0012 0.0017  
(0.0026) (0.0029) 
Acquirer sales growth − 0.0029 0.0142  
(0.0163) (0.0187) 
Acquirer CAR 0.2103*** 0.1987***  
(0.0370) (0.0408) 
Non-European acquirer 0.0152** 0.0098  
(0.0060) (0.0080) 
U.S. competitor 0.0010 0.0007  
(0.0089) (0.0090) 
ROW competitor 0.0099 0.0112  
(0.0090) (0.0094) 
Competitor size 0.0015 0.0010  
(0.0016) (0.0016) 
Competitor sales growth − 0.0154 − 0.0107  
(0.0126) (0.0127) 
Constant − 0.0286 − 0.0341  
(0.0556) (0.0601) 
Observations 295 288 
R-squared 0.1517 0.1148 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
This table presents the impact of corporate governance problems in the target firm on the CAR of the competing 
firms. The dependent variable is the 5-day CAR of direct competitors of the merging firms. The independent var-
iables are a dummy = 1 when the CEO of the target firm also served as chairperson (model 1) and a dummy = 1 
when the CEO of the target firm was replaced after the acquisition (model 2). The sample used in this table is 
restricted to deals with public stand-alone targets given the information requirements regarding the CEO and board 
of directors. We use OLS regressions and include industry (using the Fama-French industry classification) and year 
fixed effects. Control variables at the deal-, target-, acquirer- and competitor-level are included to control for po-
tential alternative explanations. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix B. Robust standard 
errors are reported between the parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
16 In the robustness section, additional models are presented in which we control for acquirer profitability and acquirer market share. 
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from the rest of the world (ROW), the base category being European competitors. Given that all targets in the study sample are Eu-
ropean, competitors from outside Europe could gain more or lose less compared to European firms, since close proximity competitors 
are potentially more harmful (Campa and Hernando, 2008; Clougherty and Duso, 2009). European firms account for 52% of all 
competitors, U.S. firms for 27%, and ROW firms for 21%. These proportions are not significantly different for various acquisition types. 
Additionally, we control for competitor size (Clougherty and Duso, 2009) measured by the natural logarithm of the competitor’s total 
assets in the year prior to the acquisition. The average competitor in the sample has total assets of €6.78 billion and competitors of 
subsidiary targets are larger than competitors of stand-alone targets (p-value = 0.07). The average competitor’s sales growth (Gaur 
et al., 2013) in the year preceding the acquisition announcement is 9.47%. Finally, year and industry effects are controlled by 
introducing year and industry dummies, using the Fama-French industry classification (Vermaelen and Xu, 2014). The maximum 
correlation between Target initiative and Competing bid is 0.34, which is expected (Table 3). 
Table 11 
Multivariate regression analysis of competitor returns – Controlling for premium paid.   
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
Asset fit Restructuring motives Multiple paid Multiple paid 
VARIABLES Subsidiary subsample Subsidiary subsample Subsidiary subsample Entire sample 
Increase Asset Fit ¡0.0094*     
(0.0054)    
Restructuring  ¡0.0149*     
(0.0076)   
Multiple paid (EV/EBITDA) - Industry adjusted   ¡0.0002*** ¡0.0000*   
(0.0001) (0.0000) 
Subsidiary    ¡0.0176*     
(0.0102) 
HHI 0.0146 0.0125 ¡0.1239** − 0.0191  
(0.0182) (0.0267) (0.0442) (0.0262) 
Number of competitors − 0.0003 − 0.0009 − 0.0020 0.0006  
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
Competing bid 0.0017 − 0.0030 0.0103 − 0.0041  
(0.0054) (0.0098) (0.0338) (0.0106) 
M&A activity/year-industry 0.0000 0.0014 − 0.0018 − 0.0028  
(0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0047) (0.0036) 
Target initiative − 0.0014 0.0045 ¡0.0829* ¡0.0196**  
(0.0057) (0.0099) (0.0431) (0.0074) 
Target/seller leverage − 0.0122 ¡0.0513** 0.0118 0.0352  
(0.0146) (0.0255) (0.0595) (0.0264) 
Acquirer size 0.0055*** 0.0043 0.0131 − 0.0047  
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0091) (0.0043) 
Acquirer sales growth 0.0111 − 0.0014 − 0.0407 0.0029  
(0.0156) (0.0193) (0.0346) (0.0242) 
Acquirer CAR 0.0375 0.0125 0.2393 0.1303  
(0.0460) (0.0577) (0.3404) (0.1416) 
Non-European acquirer 0.0047 0.0114 0.0075 − 0.0213  
(0.0062) (0.0103) (0.0462) (0.0161) 
U.S. competitor ¡0.0110** − 0.0054 − 0.0233 − 0.0135  
(0.0045) (0.0056) (0.0182) (0.0136) 
ROW competitor 0.0042 0.0118 − 0.0027 0.0005  
(0.0055) (0.0083) (0.0164) (0.0087) 
Competitor size − 0.0005 − 0.0005 − 0.0006 0.0027  
(0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0046) (0.0024) 
Competitor sales growth 0.0074 0.0024 0.0054 0.0065  
(0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0417) (0.0160) 
Constant ¡0.0977*** − 0.0683 − 0.1162 0.0589  
(0.0359) (0.0614) (0.1908) (0.0716) 
Observations 423 270 58 163 
R-squared 0.1188 0.1308 0.2708 0.1577 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes 
This table analyzes the impact of the underlying motives of acquisitions of subsidiary targets on competitors’ cumulative abnormal return. In model 1 
we include a measure of increase in asset fit, measured as the asset fit between the acquirer and the subsidiary minus the asset fit between the 
subsidiary and the selling parent (Laamanen et al. (2014)). In model 2, a dummy = 1 is included when the subsidiary is sold for restructuring motives 
in the selling parent. In models 3 and 4, we include an industry-adjusted multiple of enterprise value on EBITDA, as a proxy for the acquisition 
premium. The sample is restricted to competitors of subsidiary targets in models 1 to 3, while model 4 includes the entire sample. The dependent 
variable is the 5-day CAR of direct competitors of the merging firms. We use OLS regressions and include industry (using the Fama-French industry 
classification) and year fixed effects. Control variables at the deal-, target-, acquirer- and competitor-level are included to control for potential 
alternative explanations. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are reported between the pa-
rentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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5. Results 
Table 4 presents the announcement returns for competitors of public, private, and subsidiary targets. First, the average competitor 
return for the entire sample is not significantly different from zero, with 50% of all competitors having a positive CAR and 50% a 
negative CAR. The proportion with positive CARs, however, increases to 61% for competitors of private stand-alone targets and drops 
to 46% for competitors of subsidiaries with public parents. Second, while competitors of private targets (stand-alone or subsidiaries) 
have positive abnormal returns of +0.63% (p-value = 0.004), competitors of public targets (stand-alone or subsidiaries) have negative 
abnormal returns of − 0.28% (p-value = 0.077). A t-test suggests that competitors of private targets outperform those of public targets 
(difference = 0.91 percentage point, p-value = 0.001), in line with Hypothesis 1. 
Furthermore, competitors of subsidiaries experience negative wealth effects (− 0.31%, p-value = 0.079), while competitors of 
stand-alone targets (public or private) have zero abnormal returns (+0.28%, p-value = 0.135). The t-tests suggest that competitors of 
subsidiaries have significantly lower abnormal returns (difference = 0.59 percentage point, p-value = 0.023) than competitors of 
stand-alone targets, which aligns with Hypothesis 2. In the following section, the hypotheses are tested in a multivariate setting. 
Table 5, Panel A presents the results of the regression analyses. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models were used, with 
competitor CARs as the dependent variable. All models include year and industry fixed effects. Since multiple competitors are iden-
tified for each acquisition, regressions are clustered at the deal level to account for unobserved deal-specific variation. In addition, 
robust standard errors are computed to handle a potential heteroscedasticity problem. The low correlations and the maximum variance 
inflation factor of 4.96 suggest that potential problems due to multicollinearity are limited. 
Model 1 includes only control variables. In Models 2, 3, and 4, H1 is tested by including a dummy to distinguish between deals with 
private and public targets. Model 2 tests the entire sample, whereas Model 3 distinguishes between deals with subsidiaries of private 
parents and those of public parents. Model 4 compares deals with private stand-alone and public stand-alone targets. Models 5, 6, and 7 
include a dummy to distinguish between deals with subsidiary and stand-alone targets, and the same build-up of the models is applied. 
Model 5 tests the entire sample, while Model 6 analyzes deals with subsidiaries of public parents and public stand-alone targets, and 
Model 7 compares deals with subsidiaries of private parents and private stand-alone targets. This build-up of the regression models 
allows the hypotheses to be tested for the entire sample as well as for the relevant subsamples. Including the ownership dummy 
variables significantly improves the model fit. Model 8 uses competitors of private stand-alone targets as the reference category and 
compares them to competitors of public stand-alone targets, competitors of subsidiaries with public parents, and competitors of 
subsidiaries with private parents. This tests the combination of both arguments for the entire sample. 
Models 2, 3, and 4 strongly support Hypothesis 1: competitors of private targets show higher returns compared to competitors of 
public targets. These findings are statistically significant and economically meaningful. Compared to the acquisition of a public target, 
the acquisition of a private target is associated with 1.45 percentage points higher announcement returns for competitors. This sup-
ports the rationale of the market for corporate control, which assumes a more negative effect for competitors of public targets than 
those of private targets. Competitors of subsidiary targets with private parents have CARs, on average, 1.83 percentage points higher 
compared to competitors of subsidiary targets with public parents (Model 3). Similarly, the announcement return of competitors of 
private stand-alone targets is, on average, 1.17 percentage point higher compared to the return of competitors of public stand-alone 
targets (Model 4). 
Models 5, 6, and 7 provide consistent evidence of competitors of subsidiary targets underperforming competitors of stand-alone 
targets, which aligns with the improved asset fit effect of Hypothesis 2. On average, the CAR of competitors of subsidiary targets is 
0.90 percentage point lower compared to the CAR of competitors of stand-alone targets. The economic significance is striking in the 
subsample of private targets, where competitors of subsidiary targets with private parents have CARs, on average, 1.65 percentage 
points lower compared to competitors of stand-alone private targets (Model 7). 
Finally, Model 8 confirms the findings of the previous models and compares competitors for all four types of target ownership. 
Firstly, competitors of public stand-alone targets have lower CARs of − 1.00 percentage point on average compared to competitors of 
private stand-alone targets. The negative effect is in line with the more severe market for corporate control for public compared to 
private targets (Hypothesis 1). Secondly, competitors of subsidiaries with public parents generate significantly lower returns (− 1.65 
percentage points) compared to competitors of stand-alone private targets, which is consistent with the negative asset fit argument of 
Hypothesis 2. Therefore, the wealth-creating effects of reduced agency risks and improved asset fit impacting subsidiaries of public 
Table 12 
Acquisition probability.   
Target ownership type Public Private 
Acquired within  N Frequency N Frequency 
1 year Stand-alone 9 3% 4 2% 
3 years 25 8% 12 5% 
5 years 36 12% 18 8% 
1 year Subsidiary 11 3% 1 1% 
3 years 29 7% 3 4% 
5 years 39 10% 8 10% 
This table presents the takeover incidence of competitors within 1, 3, and 5 years after the acquisition announcement. We split the sample according 
to the initial target’s ownership type. However, no significant differences in takeover likelihood are observed between the different groups. 
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Table 13 
Comparison of SIC Rivals to E.C. competitors.  
Panel A. Descriptive statistics: Comparison of SIC Rivals to E.C. competitors  
SIC – based Rivals E.C.-based Competitors  
Public Private Subsidiary Stand-alone Public Private Subsidiary Stand-alone 
Number of rivals/competitors per deal 264.97 160.18 228.16 219.14 7.32 8.29 7.37 8.06 
HHI index 0.24 0.26 0.21 0.28 0.39 0.44 0.38 0.43 
U.S. rival/competitor 16% 14% 16% 15% 27% 27% 26% 28% 
ROW rival/competitor 68% 71% 69% 68% 22% 19% 22% 20% 
EU rival/competitor 16% 15% 15% 16% 51% 55% 52% 52% 
Rival/competitor size 11.43 11.69 11.62 11.44 15.79 15.60 15.83 15.61 
Rival/competitor sales growth 11.21% 14.51% 10.75% 13.39% 9.67% 9.01% 10.58% 8.46%   
Panel B  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Entire Sample Median split: lowest nr of rivals per deal 
VARIABLES H1: Public /vs/ 
Private 
H2: Subsidiary /vs/ 
Stand-alone  
H1: Public /vs/ 
Private 
H2: Subsidiary /vs/ 
Stand-alone  
Private (stand-alone or 
subsidiary of private 
parent) 
− 0.0017   − 0.0014   
(0.0021)   (0.0040)   
Subsidiary  − 0.0012   ¡0.0172***    
(0.0018)   (0.0052)  
Subsidiary - Private parent   − 0.0042   ¡0.0187*   
(0.0035)   (0.0096) 
Subsidiary - Public parent   0.0007   ¡0.0185**    
(0.0024)   (0.0071) 
Stand-alone - Public   0.0017   − 0.0016    
(0.0023)   (0.0052) 
HHI 0.0006 − 0.0020 − 0.0025 0.0054 − 0.0005 − 0.0010  
(0.0129) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0178) (0.0164) (0.0162) 
Number of SIC rivals 0.0000 − 0.0000 − 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Competing bid − 0.0004 − 0.0002 − 0.0005 0.0002 − 0.0053 − 0.0057  
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0044) 
M&A activity/year-industry − 0.0010 − 0.0010 − 0.0011 − 0.0020 − 0.0019 − 0.0020  
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0025) 
Target initiative 0.0028* 0.0032 0.0030 0.0007 0.0104* 0.0110*  
(0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0063) 
Target/seller leverage ¡0.0086* ¡0.0087* ¡0.0091* 0.0052 0.0068 0.0055  
(0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0094) 
Acquirer size 0.0015** 0.0015** 0.0016** 0.0033** 0.0049*** 0.0049***  
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
Acquirer sales growth 0.0045 0.0034 0.0053 0.0104 0.0139 0.0138  
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0175) (0.0148) (0.0149) 
Acquirer CAR 0.0554** 0.0583*** 0.0550** 0.0625 0.0812** 0.0822*  
(0.0218) (0.0207) (0.0217) (0.0399) (0.0406) (0.0413) 
Non-European acquirer 0.0038** 0.0030 0.0035 0.0032 0.0065 0.0066  
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0055) (0.0051) (0.0054) 
U.S. rival ¡0.0038* ¡0.0038* ¡0.0038* 0.0045 0.0039 0.0039  
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
ROW rival 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0072 0.0072 0.0072  
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0043) 
Rival size 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010  
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Rival sales growth − 0.0003 − 0.0003 − 0.0003 − 0.0040 ¡0.0046* ¡0.0046*  
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Constant ¡0.0760*** ¡0.0751*** ¡0.0778*** ¡0.1110*** ¡0.1419*** ¡0.1406***  
(0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0277) (0.0316) (0.0318) 
Observations 15,889 15,889 15,889 1229 1229 1229 
R-squared 0.0366 0.0366 0.0369 0.0733 0.0847 0.0848 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    
Panel A of this table compares the descriptive statistics of rivals, identified based on 4-digit SIC-codes, to the direct competitors, identified by the 
European Commission for the same sample of M&A deals. Panel B reports the multivariate regression analyses on the CAR of SIC rivals. In models 1 to 
3 we include all deals with all SIC rivals. In models 4 to 6 we restrict the sample to the competitors of the deals with a number of rivals per deal below 
the median. As such we focus on deals with the most precise rival identification. We include control variables at the deal-, target-, acquirer-, rival-level 
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targets reinforce each other. This implies that competition will be most enhanced when a subsidiary of a public company is acquired. 
However, the coefficient for competitors of subsidiaries with private parents is not significantly different from zero, and this suggests 
that the negative implications for competitors of market disciplining acquisitions (public targets) are as severe as the negative im-
plications of asset utilization improving acquisitions (subsidiary targets). 
To formally compare the types of acquisitions, an additional Wald test is performed (Table 5, Panel B). In line with the above 
discussion, competitors of public subsidiary targets experience the lowest returns. Comparing competitors of public subsidiary targets 
to the three other types of target acquisitions gives significant differences for all comparisons. Furthermore, the announcement returns 
of competitors of private stand-alone targets are higher than the returns of competitors of public stand-alone targets (coefficient =
− 0.0119, p-value = 0.018) and higher than the returns of competitors of subsidiaries of public parents (coefficient = − 0.0193, p-value 
= 0.000). However, the difference between competitors of private stand-alone targets and competitors of subsidiaries of private 
parents is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.419). 
Furthermore, the effects of the control variables correspond with previous research in the field. Deals with fewer competitors create 
more value for competing firms, which is in line with a market-power argument (Clougherty and Duso, 2009). Having fewer com-
petitors in a certain market facilitates pricing agreements or other types of collusive behavior. Lower competitor returns are also 
observed when targets received more than one bid. The competing bid dummy may be a proxy for the acquisition probability of 
competitors (Akhigbe and Madura, 1999), which should positively affect stock prices. Alternatively, multiple interested bidders for 
one target might reflect the higher attractiveness of that target compared to its competitors (Akhigbe and Madura, 1999). The negative 
coefficient in regression Models 4, 5, and 6 are evidence of the latter and in line with prior studies. An alternative approach to testing 
the acquisition probability hypothesis controls for merger waves by including the M&A activity in the industry. The positive coefficient 
in Model 4 confirms the importance of merger waves in explaining competitor returns (Derrien et al., 2020). 
In line with the research expectations, target or seller leverage negatively affects competitor returns. Typically, subsidiaries are 
offered for sale when the parent company is financially constrained or in financial distress (Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002). As such, these 
“fire sales” weaken the seller’s bargaining position and allow acquirers to pay lower premia and obtain higher announcement returns 
(Laamanen et al., 2014; Officer, 2007). The asset utilization of targets of distressed sellers is expected to improve post-M&A, which 
weakens the position of competitors and explains the negative effect on competitor announcement returns. Our findings, however, 
show lower competitor returns when the selling company is financially constrained or in need of funds for all types of targets. 
There is also consistent evidence of the growth probability hypothesis (Gaur et al., 2013). A higher acquirer announcement return 
sends a positive signal of industry growth, which positively affects competitor returns (Cai et al., 2011; Derrien et al., 2020). Finally, 
non-European acquirers are perceived as more harmful for competitors. This is consistent with earlier findings in the field (Akhigbe 
et al., 2003; Clougherty and Duso, 2009), and suggests that less positive market power elements are expected from foreign entrants in 
the market. 
Finally, in Model 9 of Table 5, the sample is restricted to European competitors based on the argument that competitive effects are 
strongest for close proximity competitors (Campa and Hernando, 2008). The coefficients have similar magnitudes and levels of sig-
nificance, which demonstrates the robustness of the study’s findings and indicates that competitor region does not alter the results. 
6. Robustness tests and alternative explanations 
In this section, we first discuss and control for the impact of the potential endogenous choice of target ownership type on competitor 
returns. Second, we present alternative event windows and specifications that support the robustness of the findings. Third, we test the 
underlying assumptions used to develop the hypotheses. To advance the understanding of the drivers of competitor returns, we test the 
prominent hypotheses advanced in prior literature. However, these prior studies have focused on rivals of publicly listed targets, while 
this study investigates a broader set of acquisition targets. In addition, we reject several alternative explanations related to ownership 
differences such as size, information asymmetry, and empire building. Furthermore, we demonstrate the empirical contribution of the 
precise competitor identification by comparing our findings to a sample of SIC-based rivals. Finally, we show that including deals with 
private acquirers in our sample does not alter our conclusions but opens avenues for future research. 
6.1. Endogeneity of target choice 
The choice of acquiring a target with a certain ownership type might be endogenous, as it might be driven by other factors that also 
affect competitors’ valuations. One such factor could be the development of the industry that incites acquirers to prefer one type of 
target over others. However, we partially capture this effect by including year and industry fixed effects in all models. As such, we rule 
out any industry or year specific omitted variable that might cause endogeneity problems. Alternatively, the target’s ownership type is 
related to many other aspects, such as corporate governance issues, information asymmetry, and size considerations. These aspects are 
controlled for in the remainder of this study. 
Besides the above measures to limit the potential issues of endogeneity, we use an additional instrumental variable (IV) approach, 
which suggests, however, that only limited bias is induced by endogeneity in our model. More specifically, we instrument the target’s 
private ownership type with the fraction of privately held firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry. The fraction of public versus private 
firms in an industry definitely affects the likelihood of acquiring a private firm without directly affecting competitors’ abnormal 
and industry (based on the Fama French industry classification) and year fixed effects. A detailed description of the variables can be found in 
Appendix B. Robust standard errors are reported between the parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table 14 
Deals with private and public acquirers.  
Panel A. Descriptive statistics  
Private Acquirers Public Acquirers 
Target ownership type Public Private Subsidiary Stand-alone Public Private Subsidiary Stand-alone 
Observations 67 47 46 68 146 82 101 127 
Percentage of deals 59% 41% 40% 60% 64% 36% 44% 56%          
Deal value 13.10 12.73 12.72 13.27 21.04 20.69 20.62 21.22 
Cash payment 45% 13% 30% 32% 71% 63% 76% 63% 
Equity payment 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 3% 9%          
Non-European acquirer 25% 13% 26% 16% 20% 19% 20% 19% 
Acquirer size 13.30 13.43 13.08 13.55 16.37 16.60 16.41 16.47          
Number of competitors per deal 11.36 7.43 8.11 11.57 7.32 8.29 7.37 8.06 
U.S. competitor 23% 26% 24% 24% 27% 27% 26% 28% 
ROW competitor 31% 13% 26% 26% 22% 19% 22% 20% 
EU competitor 46% 60% 50% 50% 51% 55% 52% 52% 
Competitor size 15.40 15.70 15.73 15.33 15.79 15.60 15.83 15.61 
Competitor sales growth 7.82% 3.10% 9.87% 4.71% 9.67% 9.01% 10.58% 8.46%          
Competitor CAR [− 2;+2] − 0.20% 0.17% − 0.10% − 0.10% − 0.28%* 0.63% *** − 0.31% * 0.28% 
% of positive CAR [− 2;+2] 55% 61% 61% 54% 46% 58% 47% 53%   
Panel B. Multivariate analysis of competitor returns- Including deals with private and public acquirers.  
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES H1: Public/vs/Private H2: Subsidiary/vs/ Stand-alone  
Private (stand-alone or subsidiary of private parent) 0.0113***    
(0.0031)   
Subsidiary  − 0.0037    
(0.0026)  
Subsidiary - Public parent   ¡0.0127***    
(0.0039) 
Subsidiary - Private parent   − 0.0038    
(0.0048) 
Stand-alone - Public   ¡0.0118***    
(0.0039) 
Private acquirer 0.0034 − 0.0004 0.0032  
(0.0038) (0.0031) (0.0037) 
Acquirer & Target private ¡0.0097*  ¡0.0097*  
(0.0058)  (0.0058) 
HHI 0.0006 0.0029 0.0002  
(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0061) 
Number of competitors − 0.0003 − 0.0003 − 0.0003  
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
M&A activity/year-industry − 0.0006 − 0.0006 − 0.0007  
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Non-European acquirer − 0.0033 − 0.0030 − 0.0032  
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) 
U.S. competitor − 0.0051 ¡0.0056* ¡0.0052*  
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
ROW competitor − 0.0035 − 0.0042 − 0.0036  
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
Competitor size 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003  
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Competitor sales growth − 0.0046 − 0.0047 − 0.0045  
(0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0055) 
Constant − 0.0091 − 0.0066 0.0033  
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0130)     
Observations 1369 1369 1369 
R-squared 0.0551 0.0469 0.0556 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Panel A of this table reports the summary statistics of deals with private acquirers and deals with publicly traded acquirers. Our main sample includes 
228 deals with publicly traded acquirers. In the sample selection process 114 deals with privately-held acquirers were removed. In Panel B we include 
the competitors of the 114 deals with private acquirers in the sample. The dependent variable is the competitor 5-day CAR, all models include industry 
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returns; hence, the exclusion criterion is met. Given the dichotomous nature of the instrumented variable (private ownership dummy), 
we use a three-step approach following prior studies (Golubov and Xiong, 2020). The first step uses a probit model, in which the 
fraction of private firms is used to predict the likelihood of a private target acquisition. The predicted probabilities from this first step 
are used to instrument the private ownership dummy in our 2SLS model. 
Table 6 presents the findings of the IV approach. The significant coefficient (p-value = 0.033) on the fraction of private companies 
to predict the likelihood of a private target acquisition suggests that the instrument is relevant and can be used in our 2SLS model. The 
first stage of the 2SLS model shows that the predicted probabilities provide a good estimation of the likelihood of acquiring a private 
target (p-value = 0.000). Additionally, the F-test for the excluded instrument is highly significant and above the cut-off value of 10 
(Staiger and Stock, 1997). The second stage model (with the instrumented private ownership dummy) confirms that competitors are 
more positively affected when a private, compared to a public, target is acquired (coefficient = 0.0515, p-value = 0.012). The Wu- 
Hausman test of exogeneity further indicates that the hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected at the 5% level. More impor-
tantly, the effect of target ownership structure on competitor returns remains highly significant even when explicitly controlling for a 
potential endogenous effect of target ownership. Hence, we conclude that the potential problem of endogeneity is limited in this study. 
6.2. Robustness tests: event windows and control variables 
A number of robustness tests are performed commencing with the same analyses conducted using longer and shorter event windows 
in the event study ([− 10, +10], [− 5, +5], [− 1,+1]). Shorter event windows have the advantage of a lower likelihood of confounding 
effects, while longer event windows consider information leaks or slow market responses. In Table 7, we show that the findings are 
confirmed using different event windows, although a lower significance is observed in the longer event windows. The significance of 
the control variables is robust, and their magnitude alters little. Following Eckbo (1983), we construct portfolios of competitor returns 
that control for cross-correlation in competitor firms’ abnormal returns and remove potential biases of outlier cases. The multivariate 
analyses using these portfolios of competitor returns yield qualitatively similar results reported in Table 8. In line with our previously 
reported models, returns of portfolios of competitors of private targets are a 0.93 percentage point higher compared to competitors of 
public targets. Also, in line with our findings, returns of portfolios of competitors of subsidiary targets are a 0.66 percentage point 
lower compared to competitors of stand-alone targets. 
The baseline regression models indicate the significant impact of acquirer CARs on competitors’ valuations. In Models 1 and 2 of 
Table 9, however, we show that removing acquirer CAR as a control variable does not alter the conclusions. Therefore, we are 
confident that the impact of target ownership on competitor returns is not driven by the acquirer’s announcement return. 
Additionally, when controlling for deal value and method of payment,17 the main findings are confirmed, providing additional 
evidence supporting the study’s hypotheses (Models 3 and 4). However, neither deal value nor method of payment significantly affect 
competitors’ returns, while the target ownership dummies remain significant. Consequently, the competitor effects are not driven by 
differences in payment method or deal size. 
Further, the precise identification of competitors by the EC leads to a considerable variation in the number of competitors per deal 
and hence to a significant variance in the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Considering the market structure, we control for the acquirer’s 
and competitors’ market share in Models 5 and 6 (Table 9). Additionally, a dummy is included that equals one when the market 
concentration is above the sample median. None of these variables, however, is significant, while the significance of the target 
ownership dummies remains intact. 
Finally, in Models 7 and 8, acquirer and competitor pre-acquisition profitability are added as a control variable, as well as the 
relative size of the target versus the acquirer. While including these variables significantly reduces the sample size, our main findings 
are confirmed, and the additional control variables do not significantly affect competitor returns. 
6.3. Testing the underlying assumption of hypothesis 1 
To further confirm the more severe role of the market for corporate control for public compared to private targets, the underlying 
assumption central to the theorizing is tested, starting with a closer analysis of the ownership structure of stand-alone targets. In 
Hypothesis 1, it is assumed that there is a higher concentration of ownership in private compared to public targets; therefore, this 
assumption is checked for a subsample of deals based on the ownership information in the Orbis database. Testing found that 81% of 
the public targets are classified as an independent company, which means that no shareholder holds more than 25% of the shares; this 
compares to only 15% of the private targets being classified as independent. Given the presence of blockholders in 85% of these private 
companies, the monitoring of managers is more likely, and the assumption underlying Hypothesis 1 is verified. 
(using the Fama-French industry classification) and year fixed effects. Control variables at the deal-, target-, acquirer- and competitor-level are 
included to control for potential alternative explanations. Additionally, we control for the acquirer’s ownership type as well as the interaction of 
target and acquirer private ownership type. Acquirer CAR is removed as control variable given that competitors of private acquirers are also included 
in the sample. A detailed description of the variables can be found in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are reported between the parentheses. *** p 
< 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
17 Deal value and method of payment are included as a robustness test because sample size is reduced by 15% due to missing observations for these 
variables. 
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Furthermore, the rationale underlying Hypothesis 1 suggests that competitors are more negatively affected when agency problems 
in the target company prior to the acquisitions are assumed to be higher. To test this contention, CEO information of the target 
companies was collected for the publicly listed stand-alone targets. Interestingly, in 23% of the target firms the CEO was also serving as 
chairperson of the board, which clearly increases the likelihood of agency related issues. Additionally, in 47% of the target firms, the 
CEO was replaced after the acquisition. Replacement of inefficient management supports the classical story of the market for corporate 
control. Hence, these two measures can be included to control for the likelihood of agency related problems in the target firm. Despite 
the small sample size, the regressions in Table 10 confirm that competitors are more negatively affected when agency problems are 
higher. For instance, when the CEO also serves as chair of the board in the target firm, competitors returns are 1.04 percentage points 
lower. Similarly, competitors’ returns are 1.11 percentage points lower when the CEO was replaced after the acquisition. These 
findings provide convincing evidence in line with the first hypothesis, which theorizes that more potential for discipling effects 
following the acquisition increases the competitive pressure. 
6.4. Testing the underlying assumption of hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 is built on the contention that parent firms are more likely to sell non-core, underperforming subsidiaries, often as part 
of a restructuring strategy. To test these underlying assumptions, the asset fit between the acquirer and the target is explored, using a 
measure previously employed in the literature and based on the overlap in primary and secondary 4-digit SIC codes between target and 
acquirer (Laamanen et al., 2014). As such, the asset fit between the acquirer and the subsidiary target is significantly higher (p-value =
0.017) compared to the asset fit between the former parent and the subsidiary. This finding is consistent with the arguments of Hy-
pothesis 2, stating that subsidiaries are acquired by parents that have a higher asset fit with the target compared to the former parent, 
which increases asset utilization post-M&A. Furthermore, we test if the increased asset fit and resulting increase in asset utilization 
directly affect competitor returns in the subsample of subsidiary targets (regression Model 1 in Table 11). The significantly negative 
coefficient confirms that competitors are more negatively affected when the target is acquired by a company with a better asset fit 
compared to the selling parent. 
Secondly, all deals with subsidiary targets are screened on the selling motives leading to the deal, following the assumption for 
Hypothesis 2 that the divested subsidiaries were not the core, high performing business units. Employing the Factiva database, all deals 
are manually searched and the selling firm’s press statement following the acquisition announcement analyzed to determine the 
motive for the sale. In 66% of the cases, the selling parent explicitly states company-wide restructuring or problems within the business 
unit as the reason for the divestiture. In another 31% of the cases, the parent company’s financial problems are given as the reason to 
sell. Hence, these motives for sale confirm the underlying rationale for Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, competitor returns are reduced by 
1.49 percentage points when restructuring was mentioned as the reason to sell the subsidiary (Model 2, Table 11). 
Finally, lower asset fit and restructuring motives could lead to a lower acquisition premium, which could explain the lower returns 
for competitors of subsidiary compared to stand-alone targets. Given that a market value is not available for subsidiaries, we use an 
industry adjusted multiple (Enterprise Value/EBITDA) as a proxy for the premium paid.18 In Model 3 of Table 11, the negative effect of 
the multiple indicates that competitors react more negatively when higher multiples are being paid, which contradicts the prior 
reasoning and suggests that acquisitions that paid higher multiples are more troublesome for competitors. Most importantly, we 
confirm that competitors of subsidiary targets have lower returns, even when controlling for the multiple paid. The results are 
economically meaningful with announcement returns being 1.76 percentage points lower for competitors of subsidiary targets (Model 
4, Table 11). 
6.5. Testing hypotheses advanced in prior literature 
Prior literature has advanced three potential hypotheses to explain positive rival returns: the acquisition probability hypothesis, 
acquirer hubris, and the collusion hypothesis. This section assesses whether theses hypotheses explain our findings. 
The acquisition probability hypothesis proposes that more M&A activity in an industry or a higher takeover likelihood explains 
positive competitor returns. Consequently, more interested bidders for the target indicates a more active M&A market and a higher 
takeover likelihood for competitors, which should reflect in positive competitor returns (Akhigbe and Madura, 1999; Song and 
Walkling, 2000). This means that the dummy Competing bid should be positively correlated with competitor returns. However, the 
multivariate analyses reveal a negative correlation, which does not support the acquisition probability hypothesis. A second indicator 
is whether the target or the acquirer initiated the deal. If the target is offered for sale, no increase in competitors’ acquisition prob-
ability is expected and fewer positive competitor effects are anticipated. However, the dummy Target initiative is not significant in the 
multivariate analyses, which does not support the acquisition probability hypothesis based on target initiative. Third, the M&A activity 
in the industry is typically used to control for merger waves, which predict a higher acquisition likelihood for competing firms (Derrien 
et al., 2020). Only in the subsample of deals with stand-alone targets is the M&A activity variable significantly positive. Given that the 
competitors in our sample are all stand-alone listed firms, the M&A activity is a stronger sign of future acquisition likelihood in the 
subsample of stand-alone targets. Hence, we find limited support for the acquisition probability hypothesis. 
Finally, a more direct test of the effects of future acquisition probability (Song and Walkling, 2000) is performed by analyzing the 
18 The multiple was computed by subtracting the year-industry average multiple (enterprise value/EBITDA) from the target’s enterprise value/ 
EBITDA ratio. This multiple could only be computed for a limited number of target companies for which all necessary data was available. 
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actual incidence of competitors being taken over in the years following the acquisitions in the study sample. A higher acquisition 
likelihood should be correlated with a higher announcement return for the competitors, and the highest acquisition rates for com-
petitors of private stand-alone targets should be observed if acquisition probability explains the results. The future acquisition rates for 
one-, three-, and five-years post-acquisition are presented in Table 12. Three years after the initial acquisition announcement, 4% of 
the competitors of subsidiaries of private parents were acquired, compared to 8% for those of public stand-alone targets. Unreported 
probit regressions indicate that competitors of public targets (stand-alone or subsidiaries) have a higher likelihood of being acquired 
compared to competitors of private targets. Following the acquisition probability hypothesis, a higher acquisition probability of 
competitors of public targets should lead to higher CARs. However, our findings suggest the opposite, indicating that the acquisition 
probability hypothesis is not driving the results. 
Acquirer hubris makes acquirers overconfident, and they pay high premia for the targets (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). As a 
result, competitors could benefit from the situation where the acquirer is not able to realize the expected synergies. Overconfidence 
typically occurs after periods of superior performance (Ghosh, 2001), so the acquirer’s profitability (using different operationaliza-
tions) in the three years prior to the acquisition announcement is tested. If hubris explains the competitor returns, the highest per-
formance is expected for acquirers of private stand-alone targets given that these deals are associated with the highest competitor 
returns. However, the findings do not consistently present higher performance for the acquirers of one type of target. Additionally, 
acquirer pre-M&A profitability does not affect competitor returns (Table 9, Models 7 and 8). Consequently, the evidence from this 
study does not support the hubris hypothesis. 
Following the collusion hypothesis, industries with a larger number of competitors or a lower HHI are expected to benefit less 
from the advantages of monopsonistic and monopolistic collusion (Song and Walkling, 2000). A more concentrated market with fewer 
competitors should make it easier to make pricing agreements or exert buyer power on suppliers. Therefore, based on the collusion 
hypothesis, a negative sign for the number of competitors and a positive sign for the HHI in the multivariate analyses is expected 
(Table 5). There is consistent evidence in the findings and across all four types of targets that fewer competitors are associated with 
higher competitor returns, which suggests the presence of collusive behavior. 
6.6. Alternative explanations 
First, a mere size effect instead of the agency differences related to different ownership types is eliminated. Target firm size is an 
important determinant of acquirer returns, but the direction of the effect is contingent upon the method of payment (Fuller et al., 
2002). The impact of target size on competitors has not been studied in detail in the M&A literature; however, the importance of firm 
size in the strategic management literature is ubiquitous. Larger firms benefit from economies of scale, higher bargaining power in the 
supply chain, entry barriers to deter new market entrants, and economies of scope (Porter, 1980). Therefore, larger deals are perceived 
as a bigger threat for competitors. Assuming that public deals are typically larger than private deals, this perception could explain the 
negative effect of public target ownership type on competitor returns. In comparison, stand-alone deals are typically larger than 
subsidiary acquisitions, and this would mean more negative returns for competitors of stand-alone deals compared to competitors of 
subsidiary deals, which is the opposite of Hypothesis 2. To eliminate this alternative explanation based on target size, the variables Deal 
value and relative size are included in the multivariate regressions (Table 9). Deal value refers to the consideration paid for the stake 
acquired, while relative size is measured as target total assets divided by acquirer total assets. The regressions show no significant 
effect for deal size or relative size, while the ownership dummies remain significant. 
A second alternative explanation is based on the differences in information asymmetry between public and private companies. 
Private companies are opaquer and have fewer publication requirements compared to publicly listed companies. As a result, valuing a 
private company is more difficult due to the scarcity of information, making the market for private targets far less liquid compared to 
the market for public targets. This high market liquidity and fierce competition for public targets has often led to the “winner’s curse”. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the lower liquidity for private targets has led to the “liquidity discount,” which allows acquirers to 
buy these targets at a discount and generates positive effects on acquirer returns (Fuller et al., 2002). When considered together, the 
higher information asymmetry for private targets could put competitors of these targets at a disadvantage compared to the acquisition 
of public targets. These arguments contradict the study’s findings of higher returns for competitors of private targets, which produces 
the confident conclusion that differences in information asymmetry are not driving the effects. 
Finally, the motives underlying the acquisition of a public target could be inherently different from those of a private target. 
Acquirer empire-building (Harford, 1999) explains the value destruction following some acquisitions. Managers driven by empire- 
building make decisions based on a desire to manage a larger company and to secure either their position or a larger bonus. Since 
deals with public targets are more prominent in the press and perceived as more prestigious, managers driven by empire-building will 
be more interested in acquiring public compared to private targets (Antoniou et al., 2007). The likelihood of empire-building motives 
for subsidiary versus stand-alone targets is less sharply defined, as acquiring a large subsidiary of a publicly listed parent could be 
considered more prestigious than acquiring a stand-alone private company that is unknown to the public. As a result, this study makes 
no suggestions regarding empire-building motives for acquisitions of subsidiary or stand-alone targets, but it does recognize that 
managers driven by empire-building rather than value-creation are less of a threat for competitors. Following this perspective, empire- 
building suggests less negative or more positive effects for competitors of public targets compared to private targets, which contradicts 
what is argued in Hypothesis 1. Therefore, empire-building cannot substitute this hypothesis. 
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6.7. Robustness test: rivals based on industry classification 
Most previous studies investigating the impact of M&A announcements on industry rivals have used industry classifications to 
identify rivals. Yet, following prior studies (Clougherty and Duso, 2009), we claim that this approach falsely classifies customers or 
suppliers as rival firms. As such, the case-by-case identification of competitors by the EC enables us to study actual competitor effects. 
In this section, we empirically demonstrate how industry classifications induce noise in the rival returns. 
As a robustness test, all firms active in the same 4-digit SIC code as the target firms in our sample were selected. This approach 
resulted in a sample of 15,889 rivals for the 228 deals in our sample, or an average of 70 rivals per deal for which we had all the 
necessary data. Compared to the average of eight competitors per deal in our main sample, this stresses the distinction between rivals 
and competitors. Furthermore, we observe a lower percentage of European rivals in the SIC sample compared to the EC sample 
(Table 13). Interestingly, rival size in the SIC is smaller, but sales growth is higher, compared to competitors in the EC sample. 
When turning to the multivariate analyses in Table 13, the ownership dummies in the rival CAR regressions are not statistically 
significant. Given the considerable number of rivals per deal, rival returns are most likely noisy. Consequently, the same regressions 
are run on a subsample of deals. Specifically, we perform a median split based on the number of rivals per deal and remove deals with 
more rivals than the median. The sample size is significantly reduced to 1229 rivals, and the target ownership dummies significantly 
affect rival returns. Returns of rivals of subsidiary targets, for example, are 1.72 percentage points lower compared to rivals of stand- 
alone targets. The significance of the control variables is comparable to the full SIC sample as well as to the EC sample. To conclude, 
industry classifications of rivals introduce noise in the analyses of valuation effects, especially when the number of rivals is high. 
Hence, to understand competitor effects following M&A announcements, we recommend using a more precise competitor 
identification. 
6.8. Robustness test: including deals with private acquirers 
As a final robustness test, we extend our sample to include M&A deals of both public and private acquirers. Based on the literature 
(Gaur et al., 2013; Derrien et al., 2020), controlling for acquirer announcement effects explains competitor valuations, hence, the 
initial sample is limited to public acquirers. However, recently studies consider private acquirers and their performance, suggesting 
lower agency costs in private compared to public acquirers (Golubov and Xiong, 2020). Therefore, including deals with private 
acquirers is a sensible additional robustness test. As such, we collect the data for the 114 deals with privately held acquirers and show 
that our results remain robust. 
First, the descriptive statistics in Table 14 (Panel A) indicate that the target ownership type does not differ significantly between 
public and private acquirers. Deals with public acquirers, however, are typically larger and more often paid in cash. Furthermore, we 
notice that public acquirers are larger than private acquirers, which is in line with our expectations. Remarkably, more competitors 
were identified for deals with private acquirers compared to public acquirers, especially for public and stand-alone targets. 
Second, Table 14 – Panel B (Model 1) shows that competitor returns are 1.13 percentage points (p-value = 0.000) higher when a 
private target is acquired compared to a public target. This is in line with Hypothesis 1. However, when both the target and the acquirer 
are privately held companies, competitors are more negatively affected with a drop in return of 0.97 percentage points. This finding 
underscores the importance of ownership types and the intrinsic differences between companies with different ownership types. The 
dummy Acquirer Private, not being significant when comparing competitor returns for deals with subsidiary versus stand-alone targets 
(Model 2), suggests that firms with similar ownership structures are more easily integrated, which negatively affects competitors. 
However, more research is needed to confirm this contention. Finally, our main results are confirmed in Model 3; competitors of public 
stand-alone targets have significantly lower (coefficient = − 0.0118, p-value = 0.003) returns compared to competitors of private 
stand-alone targets. Furthermore, competitors of subsidiaries of public parents also display lower returns (coefficient = − 0.0127, p- 
value = 0.001) compared to competitors of private stand-alone targets. 
7. Conclusion 
This study presents the following main findings. First, acquisitions of private targets create more positive market reactions for 
competitors compared to acquisitions of public targets, and second, acquisitions of subsidiaries affect competitors more negatively 
than acquisitions of stand-alone targets. The findings align with value-maximizing behavior in the market for corporate control. 
Acquirers of public targets are more likely to use the market for corporate control to reduce agency problems compared to acquirers of 
private targets. As a consequence, the performance of public targets is expected to improve more compared to private targets; 
therefore, competitors of private targets experience more positive revaluations compared to competitors of public targets. In contrast, 
acquirers of subsidiaries compared to stand-alone targets strongly benefit from integrating assets from a corporation that did not fully 
exploit the assets, thereby creating a stronger competitor. This integration of assets more negatively affects direct competitors of 
subsidiaries compared to stand-alone targets. Overall, we provide evidence that target ownership differences lead to distinct 
competitor revaluations following M&A announcements. This finding, however, provides many avenues for future research regarding 
the intrinsic differences in ownership types of not only targets, but also acquirers and competitors. Particularly, the impact of similarity 
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in ownership structure of the acquirer and the target is an interesting question for future research. 
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Appendix A. Sample selection process 
This table reports the sample selection process. We started from all horizontal acquisitions analyzed by the European Commission 
between October 1997 and December 2015 in the manufacturing sector. Several restriction were imposed which ultimately led to a 
sample of 228 deals in our sample.   
Phase in sample selection process Number of cases 
Horizontal acquisitions of European targets investigated by the EC between October 1997 and December 2015 in the manufacturing sector 831 
Acquisitions excluded because of:  
-Privately held acquirers 114 
-Previous relationship between merging parties 69 
-Privatizations, minority acquisitions, multiple acquisition announcements 80 
Relevant horizontal acquisitions 568 
-Missing information (on deal or firm characteristics) 337 
Final sample 228  
Appendix B. Definitions of the variables  
Deal level  
HHI Industry concentration in the year prior to the acquisition announcement, based on sales of the acquirer and all 
competitors listed in the files of the EC 
Number of competitors/deal Number of private and listed competitors of the merging firms, as indicated in the files of the EC 
Competing bid Dummy equal to1 if the target received more than 1 bid 
M&A activity/year-industry Number of M&A announcements in a certain year, in the same 3-digit SIC industry as the merging firms 
Deal value Natural logarithm of deal value 
Cash payment Dummy equal to 1 if payment consists of 100% cash 
Mixed payment Dummy equal to 1 if payment consists of a combination of cash and equity 
Multiple paid (EV/EBITDA) - 
Industry adjusted 
Target enterprise value divided by EBITDA minus the average EV/EBITDA in the same 2-digit SIC industry and year 
Relative size Target total assets divided by acquirer total assets 
HHI above median Dummy equal to 1 if the HHI is higher than the median HHI in the sample  
Target level  
Target initiative Dummy equal to 1 if the target initiated the deal 
Target/seller leverage Leverage (total debt/total assets) of the target or parent (if target is a subsidiary) 
CEO also chairperson Dummy equal to 1 if the CEO in the target firm was also chair of the board 
CEO replaced post M&A Dummy equal to 1 if the CEO in the target firms was replaced after the acquisition 
Increase asset fit Asset fit between acquirer and target minus asset fit between selling parent and target. Asset fit is measured following the 
approach of Laamanen et al. (2014) based on the overlap in 4-digit SIC code. 
Restructuring Dummy equal to 1 if the selling parent mentions company-wide restructuring or problems within the business unit as the 
reason to sell the subsidiary in the press statement following the acquisition announcement.  
Acquirer level  
Acquirer size Natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets in the year prior to the acquisition announcement 
Acquirer sales growth Acquirer’s growth in sales in the 3 years prior to acquisition announcement 
Acquirer CAR Cumulative Abnormal Return [− 2, +2] of the acquirer 
Non-European acquirer Dummy equal to 1 if the acquirer is from outside Europe 
Acquirer market share Acquirer’s sales divided by the total sales of the acquirer and all competitors in the year prior to the acquisition 
announcement 
Acquirer profitability pre-M&A Acquirer profitability, measured as EBIT/total assets, in the year prior to the acquisition announcement  
(continued on next page) 
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(continued ) 
Deal level  
Competitor level  
U.S. competitor Dummy equal to1 if the competitor is from the United States 
ROW competitor Dummy equal to 1 if the competitor is from the Rest of the World (meaning not from the United States and not from 
Europe) 
Competitor size Natural logarithm of the competitor’s total assets in the year prior to the acquisition announcement 
Competitor sales growth Competitor’s growth in sales in the 3 years prior to acquisition announcement 
Competitor market share Competitor’s sales divided by the total sales of the acquirer and all competitors in the year prior to the acquisition 
announcement 
Competitor profitability pre-M&A Competitor profitability, measured as EBIT/total assets, in the year prior to the acquisition announcement  
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